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Objective Variability in how clinicians diagnose PTSD has been studied across treatment settings. Research
shows several factors impact diagnostic variability. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the extent to
which disclosure of military service leads to an increase in diagnosis of PTSD when considering an otherwise
vague symptom profile. We hypothesize veteran status will increase the likelihood of a PTSD diagnosis than
status as a teacher. Methods Clinician were recruited online through professional message boards and
listservs. Participants were randomly assigned a vignette (veteran or teacher status) and subsequently asked to
make diagnostic judgments. Two vignettes, identical with the exception of veteran or teacher status, were
employed to represent a vague symptom profile, unremarkable for any clear diagnostic symptoms. In order to
evaluate for the specific impact of disclosure of military service, the vignettes excluded any discussion of
trauma or stressors and included vague symptoms common to any number of affective disorders. Results A
total of 366 clinicians participated in the study. Clinicians assigned to the Veteran vignette were 6-times more
likely to diagnose the client with PTSD (Std. Residuals 4.1) than would be expected by chance. Conclusion
and Implications Client characteristic of “Veteran” impacted the clinicians’ diagnostic decision. The findings
from this study support a strong relationship between individuals’ veteran status and the initial diagnostic
inference a clinician will make, specifically PTSD. Exploratory analysis of licensure status and DSM training
suggested these variables had a moderating effect on diagnostic selection. There are several implications. The
absence of a criterion A stressor is potentially undervalued for veteran clients. Results suggest more research is
needed to understand clinician factors influencing diagnostic decision-making.
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Abstract

Objective
Variability in how clinicians diagnose PTSD has been studied across treatment
settings. Research shows several factors impact diagnostic variability. The purpose of this
study was to evaluate the extent to which disclosure of military service leads to an
increase in diagnosis of PTSD when considering an otherwise vague symptom profile.
We hypothesize veteran status will increase the likelihood of a PTSD diagnosis than
status as a teacher.
Methods
Clinician were recruited online through professional message boards and listservs.
Participants were randomly assigned a vignette (veteran or teacher status) and
subsequently asked to make diagnostic judgments. Two vignettes, identical with the
exception of veteran or teacher status, were employed to represent a vague symptom
profile, unremarkable for any clear diagnostic symptoms. In order to evaluate for the
specific impact of disclosure of military service, the vignettes excluded any discussion of
trauma or stressors and included vague symptoms common to any number of affective
disorders.
Results
A total of 366 clinicians participated in the study. Clinicians assigned to the
Veteran vignette were 6-times more likely to diagnose the client with PTSD (Std.
Residuals 4.1) than would be expected by chance.
Conclusion and Implications
Client characteristic of “Veteran” impacted the clinicians’ diagnostic decision.
The findings from this study support a strong relationship between individuals’ veteran
status and the initial diagnostic inference a clinician will make, specifically PTSD.
Exploratory analysis of licensure status and DSM training suggested these variables had a
moderating effect on diagnostic selection. There are several implications. The absence of
a criterion A stressor is potentially undervalued for veteran clients. Results suggest more
research is needed to understand clinician factors influencing diagnostic decision-making.
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Chapter 1: Background and Significance
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is a mental health diagnosis rooted in
continuous controversy since its first inclusion in the DSM-III published in 1980 (Marx,
2009). Initial controversy stemmed from the conventional wisdom at the time, which
held that battlefield stress diminished once a person was no longer in combat. Tying a
diagnosis to a specific historical event was unprecedented and only gained support once it
was clear the diagnosis also applied to varied traumatic stressors including natural
disaster, sexual assault, and interpersonal violence (McNally, 2003). Thirty-five years
later, it is hardly a novel assumption that traumatic experiences can create symptoms of
psychiatric distress, yet the diagnosis of PTSD continues to reflect varied and, at times,
conflicting beliefs and attitudes about trauma and trauma-response (Rosen & Frueh,
2007).
Variability in how clinicians diagnose PTSD has been studied across treatment
settings. Research has focused on the utilization of evidence-based assessment tools, as
well as variability in how widely the construct of PTSD might be stretched by clinicians.
There is not enough research to identify what non-clinical factors lead to an increase in
the PTSD diagnosis. Understanding the drivers of clinical decision-making while serving
veterans can help ensure accurate diagnosis and appropriate treatment. The purpose of
this study is to evaluate the extent to which non-clinical considerations influence a PTSD
diagnosis. More specifically, when presented with a clinically vague case report with no
mention of a traumatic event, are clinicians exposed to a person with a history of military
service more likely to render a PTSD diagnosis than clinicians exposed to the identical
clinical profile with no noted inclusion of military service history? Second, what are the
3
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potential moderating effects of specific provider characteristics, such as demographic
data or time in practice, on the diagnostic conclusions reached?
In order to convey the significance of our findings, we review seminal literature
on PTSD and clinical decision making. We present the literature on key historical
changes the diagnostic construct of PTSD has undergone, epidemiological data on PTSD
in the military, and central debates in research literature which have informed the
revisions of the DSM PTSD criteria. We review available literature on practice variability
in the diagnosis of PTSD. Beyond PTSD, we review seminal literature on clinical
decision making and heuristics. The intention of this literature review is to provide a
cogent framework for understanding provider decision-making and the potential impact
of non-clinical data on the diagnosis of PTSD.
What is PTSD?
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual underwent significant revision in 2013,
making significant changes to the diagnostic criteria for PTSD. Subsequent to these
changes, PTSD is no longer categorized as an anxiety disorder but has been reclassified
as a trauma- and stressor- related disorder. Significant revisions went into the DSM-5
classification of PTSD, and in a paper describing the process for developing the updated
guidelines, Friedman acknowledges the complex debates which occurred within the APA
working group:
The Stressor A1 criterion has always been one of the most challenging
aspects of the PTSD diagnosis. Although it has always been easy to get
agreement that events such as rape, torture, combat, and brutal assault are
4
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traumatic, such consensus is harder to sustain when the sudden death of a
loved one is also considered traumatic, as in the DSM‐IV. Furthermore, it
has always been understood that whereas exposure to an A1 event is a
necessary condition for the development of PTSD, it is clearly not a
sufficient condition since most A1-exposed individuals do not develop the
disorder (Friedman, 2013).
In order to achieve a diagnosis of PTSD, an individual must express unique
symptoms from each of the following five criteria:
Criterion A: exposure to a traumatic stressor.
The DSM-5 defines traumatic exposure as something one must experience
directly or witness as it occurs to others and the exposure itself must be “actual or
threatened death, serious injury, or sexual violence, in the following way(s):
•

Direct exposure

•

Witnessing the trauma

•

Learning that a relative or close friend was exposed to a trauma

•

Indirect exposure to aversive details of the trauma, usually in the course of
professional duties (e.g., first responders, medics), (American Psychiatric
Association, 2013, p. 271).

National experts in PTSD evaluated and debated the diagnostic construct against
the best available research and philosophical assumptions of what should guide treatment
and cogent nosological description. The traumatic event exposure, or Criterion A, stands
out as the most controversial debate in papers describing changes to the DSM (Brewin,
Lanius, Novac, Schnyder, & Galea, 2009; Friedman, 2013). Early controversy around the
5
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traumatic stressor criteria published in the earlier DSM-IV released in 1994, centered
around the language in Criteria A being overly confining. Additional debate between
researchers pointed to the paradox that some people might experience a significant
stressor and have any number of non-PTSD responses, while others noted that many
people did not need to be exposed to a stressor as defined by the DSM-IV in order to
exhibit hallmark symptoms of the disorder (Breslau & Alvarado, 2007; Rosen, Spitzer, &
McHugh, 2008). General disagreement as to the threshold of a “traumatic” event, versus
a non-traumatic but stressful event, informed the discussion and decisions around the
DSM-5 revisions (Friedman, 2013). Prior to the development of the DSM-5 updated
standards, prominent researchers argued for doing away with the Criterion A exposure
altogether (Brewin, Lanius, Novac, Schnyder, & Galea, 2009).
The Criterion A was deemed essential and core to the construct of PTSD, but
between the DSM-IV and the DSM-5, there was an essential change: the elimination of
the requirement that following the exposure to a Criterion A event, a specific reaction
must have included an intense emotional response, specifically “fear, helplessness, or
horror” (APA, 2000, p. 467). Between the publication of the DSM-IV and the DSM-5,
significant evidence has emerged that many people may, by virtue of training or
circumstance, not react immediately to a traumatic event in any specific way and still
develop full PTSD symptomology overtime (Friedman, Resick, Resick, Bryant, &
Brewin, 2011). This finding and decision is specifically relevant to individuals who are
routinely exposed to traumatic events and trained to specifically work in highly stressful
and potentially traumatic circumstances, such as law enforcement and military.
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Criterion B: symptoms of intrusion and re-experiencing.
PTSD is defined, in part, by involuntary intrusive recollections of a traumatic
experience, which can present as dreams, dissociative reactions, or intrusive thoughts and
flashbacks. There are few changes between DSM-IV and DSM-5 in this criterion. One
specific effort was made to distinguish between the more ruminative thought processes
common to depression and the “here-and-now images and sensory memories” more
specific to PTSD (Friedman, et al., 2011, p. 551).
Criterion C: persistent avoidance.
The avoidance criterion is met by persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with
traumatic events and can include memories, places, people, objects and activities. Though
avoidance symptoms have not changed between editions of the DSM, mood and numbing
symptoms have been separated out from avoidance and are no longer captured by the
avoidance criterion. The symptom description has not changed.
Criterion D: negative alterations in cognitions and mood.
This criterion, new to the DSM-5, is a reformulation of the numbing symptoms
described in the DSM-IV and influenced by cognitive theories (Friedman, 2013). In order
to meet this criterion, an individual must experience at least two negative cognition and
mood symptoms, including impaired memory of the traumatic event, negative beliefs and
world-view, distorted beliefs about oneself and the trauma or an overall negative
emotional state including depressed or angry mood, the inability to experience joy, or
detachment or estrangement.
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Criterion E: hypervigilence or hyperarousal.
Individuals with PTSD will exhibit a heightened sensitivity to perceived risks and
distorted risk perception. This can result in an exaggerated startle reaction, the inability to
remain calm in public spaces, or a persistent feeling of being “on guard.” Between the
DSM-IV and DSM-5, the criterion has broadened to include behavioral reactivity, based
on several studies identifying externalizing behaviors as an expression of reactivity
(Friedman, et al., 2011; Kilpatrick, et al., 2003).
In spite of the utility of standardized screening and assessment for PTSD, the
diagnosis remains dependent on the clinical judgment of an individual clinical observer.
Validated, objective assessment measures are underutilized, and providers bring unique
beliefs and variation into the assessment process (Jackson, et al., 2011). Variability in
how mental health and medical providers diagnose PTSD has been studied across
treatment settings. A number of factors have been evaluated as having impact on
diagnostic variability. Studies have identified myriad factors, such as provider beliefs and
biases, as well as deficiencies in the diagnostic construct as impacting diagnostic
variability (Gravely et al., 2011; Jackson et al., 2011; McDonald & Calhoun, 2010;
Schillaci et al., 2009). Relative to other mental health diagnoses, PTSD may be
particularly vulnerable to variation in diagnostic practices, especially in light of the many
changes the diagnostic criteria have undergone since the original inclusion in the DSMIII (Spitzer, Rosen, & Lilienfeld, 2008; Rosen, Frueh, Lilienfeld, McHugh, & Spitzer,
2012). There is some evidence to suggest clients’ revelations of non-symptom data, such
as social background or history of trauma, early in the course of treatment during clinical
assessment, might have the impact of predisposing, or anchoring, a clinician towards a
8
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PTSD diagnosis even in the absence of other PTSD symptoms (Friedlander & Stockman,
1983; Woodward, Taft, Gordon, & Meis, 2009).
Since 9/11, PTSD has been publicly and repeatedly correlated with the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan, having been described routinely as the signature injury of the
years-long conflicts (Bodkin, Pope, Detke, & Hudson, 2007b; Litz, 2007; McNally, 2003;
McNally & Frueh, 2013; Rosen & Lilienfeld, 2008). PTSD has become a part of the
national dialogue when discussing our veterans’ mental health needs and experiences.
Though PTSD is not an injury unique to military service members and veterans,
subsequent to OEF/OIF, the significant majority of funding granted toward developing
novel treatments for PTSD has been specific to veterans, or within the Veterans
Administration or Department of Defense (Galea et al., 2012).
Exposure to potentially traumatic events across service branches is difficult to
measure. Current prevalence rates have been described for specific combat-deployed
units, and the exposure rates are unsurprisingly high. According to a 2011 study, up to
75% of service members deployed in support of OEF and OIF reported exposure to
incoming artillery and mortar fire, 50% reported seeing dead bodies, and between 15%
and 25% reported discharging their own weapon in combat (Ramchand, Schell, Jaycox,
& Tanielian, 2011). With these numbers, it would not be surprising if clinicians assumed
an equally high, or parallel prevalence of the development of PTSD symptoms. But
current epidemiological surveys are largely limited to deployment data and postdeployment surveys. While these studies are vital for understanding and preparing to treat
the wounds of war, they also have the potential to yield the impression that all service
members are exposed to the same levels of traumatic events. Outside of deployment,
9
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exposure to trauma is not a standard part of military service. Because PTSD is so
frequently discussed and studied in the context of the military service, it is possible that
military service itself is becoming nosologically linked with PTSD for clinicians,
particularly those with less familiarity with military day-to-day experiences.
Additionally, PTSD prevalence estimates vary, but most national military
estimates range between 12% and 21% (Hoge et al., 2014; Holdeman, 2009; Kilpatrick et
al., 2013; Ramchand et al., 2010; Richardson, Frueh, & Acierno, 2010; Tanielian, 2009).
While this rate is non-trivial, it illustrates the significant majority of service members do
not report symptoms consistent with PTSD. Even with high rates of exposure to
potentially traumatic events during deployments, fewer than 25% of service members
will report subsequent symptoms consistent with PTSD. Because of the variability of
exposure to traumatic events and even more variability in subsequent symptom
development, military service does not directly correlate to traumatic exposure or PTSD.
Issues in the Assessment and Treatment of PTSD
Significant attempts to improve access to effective care for PTSD in veterans have
led to a body of research evaluating some of the core challenges in diagnosing and
treating the disorder. In studies specifically evaluating the efficacy of current diagnostic
practices around PTSD, simple diagnostic variability and lack of utilization of validated
or standard assessment measures emerges as a central issue (Gravely et al., 2011; Jackson
et al., 2011). Though there is strong empirical evidence that there is variation and
variability in how PTSD is diagnosed and assessed, the extent to which diagnostic
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variability impacts access to services, treatment resources, individuals and health-systems
is not fully understood.
At the broadest level, one of the most obvious impacts of variability in diagnostic
practices and tools is the difficulty in establishing consistent prevalence rates when
looking at military populations (Ramchand, et al., 2010). At a more local level, diagnostic
variability has been looked at within VA and other healthcare systems, and there are two
primary, and conflicting findings: PTSD in veterans is over-diagnosed resulting in the
pathologizing of a normal and adaptive response, overloading an already burdened care
system and confounding efforts at developing effective treatments (Gravely et al., 2011;
McNally & Freuh 2012). Conversely, many researchers argue PTSD in veterans is underdiagnosed as a function of inadequate access to appropriate screening, ongoing stigma
which limits disclosure of symptoms, and ineffective differentiation by underprepared
clinicians to differentiate between other psychiatric disorders and PTSD (Keane, Taylor,
& Penk, 1997; Magruder & Yeager, 2008; Marx et al., 2012; Schillaci et al., 2009). There
is also ongoing debate over what makes for a normal human response versus a
pathological response when confronted with significantly stressful events (Bodkin et al.,
2007b; Bonanno, 2004; Litz, 2005). The argument over how PTSD is conceptualized,
defined, and utilized is not simply an academic problem impacting research findings and
population health data, but an issue of diagnosis and subsequently providing appropriate
treatment. Following the failure to attend to the psychological wounds of our Vietnam
and Korean War veterans, military and veteran’s treatment centers now routinely screen
for PTSD in any service member or veteran who has been deployed. In these settings
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there is profound variability in how clinicians integrate standardized screening measures
and ultimately diagnose PTSD (Gravely et al., 2011; Jackson et al., 2011).
At best, the research discrepancies can be frustrating for front-line clinicians,
patients, policy makers and clinical educators seeking to ensure timely and effective
treatment. From the papers of those who argue for more proactive screening and
diagnosis, there are medical and moral reasons given for prompt screening and diagnosis
of PTSD. Medically, the most disabling symptoms of PTSD are considered highly
treatable with early intervention (Lobbrecht, Wicherts, Morina, & Priebe, 2014;
Richardson, Rumbaugh Jr, & Zembrzuska, 2015). Morally, the sacrifices of our veterans
result in a social responsibility to attend to their emotional and mental wounds
engendered in national defense (Kolk & Najavits, 2013). There are consequences to
both over-diagnosing and under-diagnosing the disorder. These risks include creating
issues with access to care, failure to offer disorder-appropriate treatment, and overpathologizing a normal adaptive response.
For those who are critical of the diagnosis and the manner in which it is applied
there are a couple of key themes. First, the rate of veterans seeking compensation for
PTSD is growing at a rate considered to be disproportionate to the actual development of
PTSD (McNally & Frueh, 2013). Second, PTSD as a diagnostic construct has been
exposed to considerable scrutiny since it was first proposed for inclusion in the DSM-III
in 1980 and through subsequent revisions the scrutiny has not lessened (Bodkin, Pope,
Detke, & Hudson, 2007a; Breslau & Alvarado, 2007; Litz, 2003; McNally, 2003; Rosen
et al., 2008; Rosen, Lilienfeld, Frueh, McHugh, & Spitzer, 2010). Of all the diagnoses
present in the multiple editions of the DSM, PTSD has undergone, by far, the most
12
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significant changes from edition to edition (Spitzer, First, & Wakefield, 2007). Between
the DSM-III and DSM-IV, PTSD was altered so that the traumatic experience criteria no
longer required the direct experience of a specific event but could be met by secondary,
or vicarious, trauma (McNally, 2003; Spitzer et al., 2007). This led to what some
researchers and clinicians claimed was conceptual bracket creep, and researchers
frequently noted other disorders are likely being encapsulated by a PTSD diagnosis, due
to issues with the vagueness of its criteria (Bodkin et al., 2007b; McNally, 2003; Rosen &
Lilienfeld, 2008). In spite of broadening the criteria around trauma exposure (criterion
A), the DSM-V continues to draw very specific parameters around qualifying events.
Those critical of adjustments to the criteria around trauma exposure have said that it
“tie(s) clinicians’ hands” and removes previously qualifying events, such as the death of a
child from prolonged illness or the remote death of an esteemed battlefield commander,
from consideration as a criterion A stressor (Hoge et al., 2016).
In spite of the ongoing controversy, it would seem all parties agree that there is a
lot at stake for a vulnerable population. How we understand and classify the emotional
and mental health injuries incurred in combat translates into how we develop and deliver
effective treatments. If screening, diagnosis, and treatment options are to be improved for
our veterans, we must account for potential hindrances to delivering that care.
Conceptual Challenges with PTSD as a Diagnostic Construct
Rosen and Lilienfeld (2008) open their evaluation criticism of the core
assumptions of PTSD with an acknowledgement of the controversy surrounding the
diagnosis. Citing Spitzer, First, and Wakefield (2007) they note: “Since its introduction
13
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into the DSM-III in 1980, no other DSM diagnosis…has generated so much controversy
in the field as to the boundaries of the disorder, diagnostic criteria, central assumptions,
clinical utility, and prevalence in various populations” (as cited by Rosen & Lilienfeld,
2008, p. 838). Rosen and Lilienfeld (2008) evaluate the construct validity of PTSD and
whether it possesses “substantial incremental validity for predicting clinically important
external validating criteria, above and beyond extant and better validated diagnoses (e.g.,
specific phobia, generalized anxiety disorder, depression)” (p. 838).
Rosen and Lilienfeld’s (2008) critique specifically identifies significant problems
in the current research about the criterion A (experience or exposure to trauma)
relationship to clinically significant distress. They note a wide body of mental health and
epidemiology research that finds the fulfillment of PTSD symptom criteria absent any
traumatic stressor—instead following natural life stressors of friendship difficulties,
marital distress, bereavement, and frightening television programs (p. 839). The question
underlying their critique, then, is whether clinicians/researchers are ‘looking’ for
something specifically different than normal human responses to normal human stressors
when evaluating for PTSD? Further supporting the idea that PTSD is a category that
might be too broadly applied, they cite a study by Bodkin, Pope, Detke, and Hudson
(2007) who found that individuals presenting for treatment of depression or anxiety, but
not PTSD and with no endorsement of a trauma history, were diagnosed with PTSD—at
a rate of 78%—by noting they were able to recall a distressing time (in place of a
traumatic stressor) when responding to assessment questions from a Structured Clinical
Interview (SCID).

14

Crystal Shelton
Conversely, it is entirely possible (indeed, likely) to experience trauma and not
develop PTSD symptomology. In traditional dose-response models the clinical response
would be, in some way, equivalent to the magnitude of the stressor. This does not appear
to be the case with PTSD. Rosen and Lilienfeld (2008) cite no fewer than 15 reviews,
structural equation modeling studies, psychological research studies and meta-analyses
that find “(a) most individuals do not develop PTSD after Criterion A events, (b) simple
dose-response relationship is often not supported, and (c) factors extraneous to the event
contribute more variance to clinical outcome than the event itself” (p. 840). The ideas that
traumatic events have little predictive value in assessing symptoms and symptoms of
PTSD are not considered unique to trauma-response pose serious challenges to the
validity of the PTSD diagnostic construct according to Rosen and Lilienfeld (2008).
The concern over construct validity might have front line clinicians scratching
their heads, as they routinely see psychiatric distress associated directly with traumatic
events. But if we are to commit to providing the best possible treatment, as measured by
consistent reduction in symptom distress, then it is incumbent on providers to regard
studies like Rosen and Lilienfeld (2008) as challenges to reduce vagaries and variation in
diagnosis and resulting treatment. One of the most significant challenges noted by Rosen
and Lilienfeld (2008) is posed by comorbidity and symptom overlap. Comorbidity in and
of itself does not pose a challenge to the distinctness of PTSD as a diagnosis, but “the
problem is that many of the symptom criteria that define PTSD also serve to define the
very disorders with which PTSD most frequently occurs,” (p. 845).
In a 1997 paper Keane, Taylor and Penk reported on their study specifically
intended to measure if PTSD can be diagnostically distinguished between other
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frequently co-occurring psychiatric disorders, particularly major depressive disorder
(MDD) and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). Utilizing an instrument which included
80 specific line-item symptoms and associated features relating to PTSD, MDD and
GAD, they assessed 340 clinicians experienced in diagnosing PTSD with their ability to
sort and rate individual symptoms into distinct diagnostic categories. They noted that
their study was able to answer, “Can clinicians differentiate PTSD from GAD and
MDD?” by analyzing the degree of difference in scoring by clinicians who each rated the
same 90 symptoms (p. 320). Multivariate and univariate analysis of variance provided
strong support for the idea that PTSD is readily differentiated from MDD and GAD along
symptom clusters as well as associated features. The authors also acknowledged certain
limitations of the study. While their findings support the idea that experienced clinicians
are able to respond to nominal prompts, they were not asked to rate actual patients who
present with vague and overlapping symptoms. This means, for the purpose of their
study, clinicians were reporting on their memory of “prototypical” patients (p. 326).
Diagnostic Accuracy and Clinical Judgment
One can begin to understand the importance of clinical consistency in assessing
and treating PTSD when reviewing literature related to the clinical practice guidelines for
PTSD. Benzodiazepines, largely considered effective in treating GAD and specific
phobias, has been shown to be ineffective in treating PTSD (Guina, Rossetter, DeRhodes,
Nahhas, & Welton, 2015; Lund, Abrams, Bernardy, Alexander, & Friedman, 2014;
Mohamed & Rosenheck, 2008a; Mohamed & Rosenheck, 2008b; Rosen et al., 2013).
Nonetheless, long after this was identified, benzodiazepines continued to be a routine
16
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treatment. In 2013, researchers conducted a cross-sectional analysis of national Veterans
Health Agency (VHA) psychopharmacological data from 2009. They reviewed the
records of 356,958 veterans with active diagnoses of PTSD who were receiving
medication from VHA prescribing providers. In spite of widely circulating guidelines
noting the detrimental impact of benzodiazepines as a pharmacological agent for the
treatment of PTSD, 37.0% of patients had received a benzodiazepine prescription in the
last year. This was not simply an issue of quick prescribing in primary care given 68.8%
of these prescriptions were written by mental health clinicians.
There are limits to what can be inferred by extant data. Little is known about the
mechanisms responsible for the wide variety of diagnosing and prescribing practices of
clinicians working with PTSD. Little is known about the clinical judgment that leads a
clinician to formulate a treatment plan or diagnosis in or out of accordance with best
practice standards. In an attempt to make diagnosis and the pipeline to treatment
straightforward, the VA system (responsible for the vast majority of military-related
PTSD care) theoretically utilizes standardized screening, interviews, and multimodal
testing as a routine measure. However, in a study reviewing clinical variability in PTSD
diagnosis by mental health providers, fewer than 15% of 138 surveyed clinicians reported
ever using a standardized interview, less than 1% reported using functional assessment
scales, and fewer than 59% reported relying on any testing (Jackson et al., 2011). Clinical
diagnosis should be formed by clinical information, specifically symptom reports and
biomedical data (Trechak, 1999). There is data to suggest that clinical judgment is
influenced by a variety of non-clinical factors.
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The DSM was developed on the assumption that psychiatric disorders should be
orderly, recognizable, and classified as objectively as possible and assessed standardly
irrespective of theoretical orientation. Though psychiatric disorders have always been
classified with a specific nosology, the classifications and characterizations of early
psychological constructs were highly subjective (Shorter, 2013). Classical psychological
theories intentionally drew from the affective experience of the observer/expert to inform
conclusions about the subject (Garb, 1994; Kim & Ahn, 2002). Objectivity was not a
central construct in early psychological theory. But over the last several decades, the
subjective analysis of the observer has become largely subordinate to more rigorous
conventions within both clinical research and practice. Even within qualitative research,
there is a strong movement to improve interrater reliability (Armstrong, Gosling,
Weinman, & Marteau, 1997; Glaser, 2017). The current classification system for
psychiatric diagnoses does not explicitly place any primacy on the subjective
interpretation of the observer/expert. Disorders are standardized and explicitly defined to
a degree that limits, in as much as is possible, subjectivity.
Even as we move towards highly empirical and standardized models of
assessment and treatment, clinicians, not computers, are responsible for diagnosing and
treating the overwhelming majority of psychological injuries and illnesses. It isn’t
necessarily reasonable or desirable for clinicians to completely suspend their internal
judgments in favor of rigid algorithms. However, improving accuracy and validity within
diagnosis and assessment requires limiting subjective interference. Structured Clinical
Interviews routinely are shown to yield more accurate and valid diagnosis than
unstructured and interpretive clinical assessments (Basco et al., 2000; Miller, Dasher,
18
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Collins, Griffiths, & Brown, 2001). Psychology and social science are, by definition, a
human enterprise, therefore, understanding what drives clinical judgment is important to
improving healthcare quality ( Hajjaj, Salek, Basra, & Finlay, 2010; Nelson, Stith, &
Smedley, 2002; Spoont et al., 2014). At the broadest level, understanding what factors
influence clinical judgment and decision-making can help to inform clinical training and
service delivery frameworks that can improve quality healthcare and research for
everyone.
Clinical judgment research is broad and crosses all medical and clinical
disciplines. The broadest body of research into clinical judgment has been conducted in
the field of family medicine and general medical practice (Blumenthal-Barby & Krieger,
2015). Blumenthal-Barby and Krieger (2015) identified 5606 studies that evaluated
biases and heuristics across client and clinician populations. Because cognitive processes
typically occur without notice or observation, many of the factors that impact clinical
judgment are subtle and not easily observed (Garb, 2005; Kihlstrom, 1990). Some
clinical judgment research has focused on identifying the hazards of specific factors such
as biases, socioeconomic and racial beliefs, stereotyped beliefs about prototype-patients
and non-clinical contextual factors. Other research has identified positive aspects of
cognitive short-cuts, or heuristics.
Heuristics
A heuristic, in general, is a concept that refers to a decisional process wherein an
individual will assimilate certain information, or limited data points, into a broader
contextual meaning, allowing for “short cuts” in thinking (Garb, 2005). Cognitive
heuristics, formulated by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), have been applied to describe
19
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how clinicians think. Biases and heuristics are frequently used interchangeably but they
are not identical concepts. Heuristics, broadly stated, refer to the cognitive processes at
play when making judgments under uncertainty (Blumenthal-Barby & Krieger, 2015;
Dumont, 1993; Elstein, 1999; Garb, 2005). In the context of clinical decision-making and
judgment, clinicians are, almost always, working from imperfect and incomplete
information. A patient presenting for psychological assessment is unlikely to relate their
problems, symptoms, stressors, and social context in a complete and cogent way. Instead,
there are a number of influences that impact how someone might recall or present their
information to a clinician during an assessment (Arkes, 1981; Bloom & Bloom, 1963;
Dumont, 1993). For example, based on mood or events of the day, an individual can be
expected to assign weight to perceived vulnerabilities differently on one day than another
(Blumenthal-Barby & Krieger, 2015; Harding, 2004; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). The
clinician’s task is to assimilate the incomplete information into a cogent assessment. The
process by which a clinician fills in the gaps and makes inferential judgments is driven by
heuristic strategies.
The heuristic strategies an individual might employ are driven by myriad factors.
A clinician’s theoretical orientation has significant influence on how s/he forms
judgment. Theoretical frameworks exist to create context for how clinicians view a
client’s presenting problems and, by extension, make inferential leaps in the absence of
information. Clinicians trained in specific schools or adherent to a specific clinical school
of thought can be expected to filter facts and develop inferential conclusions through the
lens of their specific orientation. Therefore psychoanalytic, Rogerian, or cognitive
therapists are likely employ to heuristic strategies specific to their orientation, but
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somewhat similar to those within their own school when assessing a client (Bandura,
1969; Dumont, 1993). Heuristics are, in many ways, helpful in consolidating vast
amounts of information in a way that allows for ready formation of causal theories. But
there are risks, too. Blumenthal-Barby and Krieger (2014) suggest that reliance on
heuristic strategies may ultimately lead to the development of “cognitive biases, i.e.,
systematic and predictable errors in judgment” (p. 539). Additionally, initial clinical
judgments appear to be stubborn and resistant to change, even in the context of new
presenting information (Dumont, 1993).
Several heuristic strategies, unrelated to a specific theoretical orientation have
been described as having universal impact on clinical practice. These are described
below.
Affect heuristic
Introduced by Slovic et al (2002), the affect heuristic describes one’s affective
responses to information, an instantaneous process linking emotions to one’s beliefs. The
authors outline a theory, drawn from cognitive neuroscience and literature on
psychological somatization, that when an individual experiences a stimulus, there is an
immediate categorizing of the stimulus based on their own affective response which
informs their future judgment about the stimulus. They note “affective responses occur
rapidly and automatically—note how quickly you associated with the stimulus words
treasure or hate. We argue that reliance on such feelings can be characterized as the affect
heuristic” (p. 1335). Drivers of affective response are not necessarily positive or negative
experiences in an individual’s history. Indeed, it has been identified that repeated
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exposure to a stimulus is enough to create positive preference and positive affect towards
stimuli (Bornstein, 1989; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2007; Zajonc, 1968).
The affect heuristic was not framed specifically around clinical judgment. Slovic
et al., (2007) drew largely from social and cognitive psychology to explain how affective
response drives general judgment. It was Garb (2005) and Dumont (1993) who linked the
impact of an affect heuristic to clinical judgment. Garb described the impact of the affect
heuristic as significant, and succinctly noted that how a clinician feels about a stimulus
has a major impact on their clinical judgment. The direct implication is that clinical
judgment isn’t formed solely by the input and processing of clinical information. An
additional component to clinical judgment is driven by a clinician’s affective response to
clinical and non-clinical data presented by the client. Because clients receiving clinical
assessment come from a broad array of backgrounds and present under various
circumstances, there are myriad factors to which a clinician responds. A client’s
socioeconomic background, style of dress, profession, or personal history might evoke a
subtle and unobserved affective response. If this response is positive, the clinical
judgment might then align with the ascribing or assessing of positive qualities. For
example, beliefs that a client demonstrates resilience, sympathy, and worthiness might be
evoked by a general affective response. Conversely, if the affective response a clinician
experiences is negative, there is risk of assigning more negative clinical assumptions, for
example, when a client is assessed as attention-seeking, non-resilient, and problemcausing (Garb, 1994; Garb, 2005).
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Representativeness heuristic
Representativeness is described in the earliest literature on heuristics as the
“major heuristic for making causal judgment” (Dumont, 1993, p.198). Something is
representative if it has a similar antecedent, and the two phenomena become cognitively
linked for an individual. Representativeness is established through probabilistic
reasoning, that is, “what is the probability that object A belongs in class B? What is the
probability that event A originates from process B? What is the probability that process B
will generate event A?” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, p. 109). If we have a neighbor who
demonstrates helpfulness, keeps their property tidy, and is generally reliable, what is the
probability that they are responsible for neighborhood graffiti? If a client experiences
violence perpetrated by a group of adolescents, future groups of adolescents may become
representative of that threat. The significance of the representativeness heuristic is that it
becomes a part of one’s formal thought structure, such that disconfirming evidence, i.e.,
repeated exposure to groups of non-violent adolescents, are filtered out and not integrated
into one’s broader perspective (Dumont, 1993; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
Conversely, clinicians apply instantaneous probabilistic reasoning to client data,
making cause and effect inferences with limited and incomplete data. Without knowing a
comprehensive history, it is common for a clinician to make inferential leaps that
contemporary concerns are grounded in early life events for clients. Because time with
clients is frequently limited, this can be an important process for expediting meaningful
case-formulations and treatment plans.
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Availability heuristic
One of the fundamental challenges with clinical assessment is the relative paucity
of relevant data. Frequently clients do not recall or ascribe minimal value to important
life events. The data, however complete, is not translated directly into a case
conceptualization. Instead, salient clinical information is reduced, or filtered, by the
clinician based on a number of factors, rendering a select amount of information available
for case formulation. A number of clinician-driven factors have been found to reduce the
available data used in clinical case conceptualization: biased beliefs about what is
relevant, theoretical orientation, clinicians’ personal histories, and potentially even the
time of day (Fiske & Taylor, 2013). The information that is presented to a clinician is
filtered through “screens of beliefs, theories, behavioral principles, and personal
schemata” (Dumont, 1993, p. 198).
Individuals do not recall information presented to them with crystalline memory.
Anything one learns or hears is processed through one’s own recollective process. The
information presented during an assessment, and over the course of therapy is recalled
and utilized according to clinician memory, client emphasis, and the extent to which it is
ascribed value by both clinician and client. Studies conducted to learn how individuals
process information have identified broad subjectivity in how they/a person assign(s)
value to the information presented to them/him/her in a variety of contexts. There is risk,
then, that the way information is presented in a clinical interview may affect how that
information is weighted and valued by the clinician. In addition, the subsequent way in
which the clinician recalls that information can be based on a number of subjective
criteria that may or may not reflect the client’s broader reality. Social psychologists have
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set up experiments on how an individual’s mood impacts an individual’s recollection and
processing of information. Individuals in a negative mood may be more likely to interpret
and process information in a negative manner (Bower, 1981; Isen, 1984). The availability
heuristic describes the automatic filtering and recollection of clinical data, leaving only
what passes through the filter available for clinical assessment. Several writers have
pointed out that the information that most commonly makes it through the filter and is
utilized is the most dramatic and vivid information, which may routinely eclipse the more
mundane, but potentially equally important information (Dumont, 1993; Isen, 1984;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
For an example of the potential risks associated with the availability heuristic,
consider a clinical assessment wherein a client reveals a recent traumatic event. Because
the trauma is a vivid and relatable data point in the assessment, issues like chronic poor
self-esteem, ongoing personal stress within a relationship, and a history of benevolent
neglect by a parent may be easily overlooked. Consequently, the trauma may be the
central focus of an assessment and subsequent intervention. It is a vivid and dramatic cue
that limits the extent to which other salient issues are recollected in the therapeutic
engagement.
Bias
The differentiation between heuristics and biases is not always discrete. Some of
the seminal literature on heuristics refers to cognitive biases and heuristics almost
interchangeably and without differentiation (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). One
researcher noted that decisional shortcuts in medicine are referred to as heuristics, until
they fail, at which point they are then called “cognitive errors,” (Croskerry, 2002). That
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said, most heuristic studies and theoretical papers are somewhat agnostic, overall, on the
negative aspects of heuristics. They are frequently described as the necessary cognitive
processes which allow clinicians to make rapid sense of incomplete information. It may
be that some biases are not harmful or impacting. But there are several biases that have
been researched and found to have significant negative impact on clinical care.
In 2002, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) issued a review of 100 studies on the
impact of race and ethnicity of patients on the healthcare they received (Nelson et al.,
2002). The studies reviewed controlled for other potentially confounding variables
(including socio-economic status, insurance, gender, etc.) in order to more accurately
assess the specific impact of race and ethnicity. The authors of the report did not hide
their surprise at the consistency of research findings indicating significant discrepancies
in the receipt of clinical services between Caucasian and minority patients across disease
areas (Nelson et al., 2002).
In a separate study assessing physician attitudes towards patients of different
races and socioeconomic statuses, the authors developed a 22-item survey to assess
physician’s attitudes towards patients following routine cardiac procedure (Van Ryn &
Burke, 2000). Physicians completed 618 surveys, subsequent to encounters with black,
white, male and female patients. The investigators found that physicians participating in
the study identified black patients as less intelligent than white patients, less likely to
abstain from alcohol abuse, and less likely to be rational. Physicians participating in the
study identified black patients as significantly less likely to be “pleasant or likable,” and
significantly more likely to be medically non-compliant (p. 820).
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It can be difficult to study racial bias among clinicians. People are unlikely to
recognize bias, and factors such as social desirability lead to clinicians performing in a
way they think is the most desirable and less reflective of unfiltered biases and beliefs. In
one study specific to mental health, clinicians were primed with words associated with
African American stereotypes (Negroes, Blacks, lazy, blues, rhythm, Africa, stereotype,
ghetto, welfare, basketball, unemployed, and plantation). A comparison group was
primed with neutral words (water, things, wood, television, etc.). The clinician group
exposed to the racially stereotypical words were significantly more likely to rate a
fictional client presented in a subsequent clinical vignette more negatively on a rating
scale, specifically on hostility-related measures (Abreu, 1999). A 2015 NIH-funded
systematic review identified low-to-moderate levels of implicit bias across clinical
professions: primary care, nursing, psychiatry and psychology (Hall et al., 2015). This
review included the results of 15 unique studies, with only one not finding provider bias
impacting health care decisions or treatment outcomes.
The impact of bias on clinical judgment is not limited to race. In a seminal study
on the influence of socio-economic class on psychiatric diagnoses, an otherwise vague
clinical case study was much more likely to be assigned a severe diagnosis (psychotic
disorder) if the client, identical in every other way to a comparison client, was believed
by the clinician to belong to a lower socio-economic group (Di Nardo, 1975).
Gender bias in clinical diagnosis has been studied for decades, but the findings
remain controversial and subject to ongoing debate (Hartung & Widiger, 1998). The
DSM-III was criticized for gender-bound descriptions of symptomology that might lead
to an otherwise healthy female fulfilling the criteria for Histrionic or Borderline
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Personality Disorder, if assessed at the wrong moment in time (Kaplan, 1983). With
arguments about the gendered-assumptions of DSM architects, it has complicated the
study of clinician versus construct issues when it comes to assessing the impact of gender
on clinical diagnosis (Hartung & Widiger, 1998; Trechak, 1999). Even committee
leadership who participated in the drafting of the DSM-III acknowledged significant
conceptual issues around gender and conceded gender bias constituted “a major flaw in
its scientific and clinical value” (Widiger & Spitzer, 1991, p. 2).
Anchoring and Adjustment
Within sociology and cognitive sciences, a number of studies have identified the
phenomena in which information presented early bore significantly greater impact on
formation of judgment than subsequent information presented. The initial information
creates an anchor, which constrains the degree to which subsequent information is
utilized to adjust one’s judgment (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). That is, “different
starting points yield different estimates, which are biased towards the initial value,”
(Tversky, 1974, p. 1128). Non-clinically, this phenomenon has been repeatedly
demonstrated during sociological experiments (Friedlander & Stockman, 1983; Tversky,
1974).
Because clinicians are required to make judgments based on incomplete data,
their first formulation should, ostensibly, adjust as new information supplements the
initial clinical picture. If the literature on anchoring effects translates from general
judgment to clinical judgment, there is the risk that clinical judgment is biased towards
information that is presented early in the clinical assessment process. Studies have
produced varied results when testing potential anchoring effects on clinical judgment. In
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one study, findings supported the anchoring effect of when information was presented, by
using clinical vignettes with an otherwise identical symptom profile, manipulated only to
present a history of Childhood Sexual Abuse (CSA) early in the vignette or later in the
vignette. The study asked clinicians to form a diagnostic impression between PTSD or
Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD). Clinicians presented with the history of CSA
early in the case presentation were significantly more likely to incorporate the trauma
context into their diagnosis and assigned PTSD as the case assessment. Clinicians who
were presented with the same vignette, but the CSA history presented later in the case
review, were more likely to diagnose BPD (Woodward et al., 2009).
The evidence of an anchoring effect on clinical judgment, however, is far from
conclusive. Ellis, Robbins, Schult, Ladany, and Banker (1990) looked at the extent to
which clinical judgments would be adjusted with the introduction of subsequent
information, in this case, vignettes regarding a fictitious case example of a male
presented with symptoms of an eating disorder. The “additional” information was
intended to present a potentially new clinical picture, testing the power of the anchoring
effect. Instead, they found the diagnosis arrived at by research participants did not reflect
anchoring, and the research participants adjusted their diagnosis according to the new
information. In another study, Friedlander and Stockman (1983) found mixed results.
Utilizing clinical vignettes, the case presentations were altered in a manor to vary when
salient diagnostic information was presented. In this case, significant anchoring effects
were found in the case of a client who was presented as clinically moderate, but no
anchoring effects were found with a client who was presented as severely suicidal.
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Assessing Clinical Decision-Making
Clinical vignettes are considered useful tools in assessing clinical decisionmaking. They have been applied in nursing research to examine professionals’ attitudes
and beliefs (Evans et al., 2015; Hughes, 02). They have also been used in social work
research to evaluate clinical judgment in mental health and child welfare systems
(Wallander, 2011). Psychology researchers have utilized clinical vignettes to assess the
impact of provider bias in clinical assessment (Evans et al., 2015). Vignettes have the
value of being inexpensive and much easier to conduct than an observational study. It is a
well-validated component of experimental analysis in social and medical science research
(Evans, Roberts, Keeley, & Blossom, 2005; Mendel et al., 2011; Veloski, Tai, Evans, &
Nash, 2005; Wallander, 2011; Woodward et al., 2009).
In summary, while PTSD prevalence estimates vary, most national estimates
range between 12% and 21% (Hoge et al., 2014; Holdeman, 2009; Kilpatrick et al., 2013;
Ramchand et al., 2010; Richardson, Frueh, & Acierno, 2010; Tanielian, 2009). In
addition, PTSD as a diagnostic construct changes frequently (Bodkin et al., 2007b;
McNally, 2012) and that may lead to clinically variable conceptualization among
providers assessing real-time patients in the process of conducting a diagnostic
assessment (Keane et al., 1997; Rosen & Lilienfeld, 2008). Additionally, clinical
judgment has been shown to be influenced by a number of non-clinical factors which
may impact diagnostic accuracy. Given the importance of appropriate diagnosis and
screening for PTSD, this study intends to fill the gap in the current literature in how
veteran status specifically influences diagnostic decision-making.
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For the purpose of the present study, clinical vignettes were applied in an effort to
test the following hypothesis: clinicians presented with a vague symptom report are more
likely to diagnose PTSD if they are presented information that the patient has a history of
military service compared to clinicians presented with the same symptom report with no
disclosure of military history and is instead identified as a teacher. Additionally,
exploratory analysis was conducted on participant factors to measure which clinician
characteristics may have a moderating effect on the diagnosis of PTSD, including time in
clinical practice, the era a clinician was trained (under DSM-IV or DSM-5), theoretical
orientation, professional license type and/or status, race, gender, age, practice setting, and
practice location.

31

Crystal Shelton
Chapter 2: Research Design and Methods
Methods
The primary purpose of this study was to evaluate the influence of a single, nonsymptom variable on the assessment of PTSD by clinical professionals. More
specifically, the aim was to test the hypothesis that disclosure of military service may be
interpreted as equivalent to a criterion A stressor, even in the absence of any description
of trauma associated with military history. A secondary aim of the study was to explore
moderating effects on diagnosis based on participant characteristics. Two vignettes,
identical with the exception of veteran status, were drafted to represent a vague symptom
profile, unremarkable for any clear diagnostic symptoms. In order to evaluate for the
specific impact of disclosure of military service, the vignettes excluded any discussion of
trauma or stressors in order to avoid any other priming towards a PTSD diagnosis. In
addition, the vignettes did not identify client gender or age, and included vague
symptoms common to any number of affective disorders, thereby isolating military
service as the sole variable under examination. For equivalency between vignettes, a
profession was assigned to the control group: teacher. To test the hypotheses, respondents
consenting to an anonymous online diagnostic survey were randomly assigned to the
vignette with or without the disclosure of a history of military service. All procedures
were approved by the University of Pennsylvania Institutional Review Board.
Creation of Vignettes
To ensure the verisimilitude of the vignettes, a draft vignette was presented to a
panel of experts. The panel was composed of 11 mental health providers across
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disciplines: psychiatry, social work, psychology, and psychiatric nurse practitioners. Each
panel member was in possession of their current license and was in practice more than 6
years across a variety of settings, including community mental health, academic settings,
private practice, inpatient psychiatry, and in military and veteran-specific treatment
centers. Vignettes were emailed to panel members individually with a request to suggest
edits which would capture the most commonly reported, diagnostically agnostic
complaints presented in early clinical assessments. All panel members responded with
input and the vignettes were refined following feedback.
Following the input from the panel members, the vignettes were redrafted and
resubmitted to the panel. Once each individual panel member responded via email that
this was a reasonable, common and vague presentation, the vignette was finalized to
include the following characteristics:
•

Insomnia: In addition to being a specific, diagnosable disorder, insomnia is
strongly associated with depression (where it is named as a specific criteria for
diagnosis), anxiety, and PTSD (Baglioni et al., 2011; Inman, Silver, &
Doghramji, 1990; Taylor, Lichstein, Durrence, Reidel, & Bush, 2005; Walsh,
2004).

•

Emotional detachment: This is a hallmark symptom of depression, but is also
accounted for in the criterion D symptoms of PTSD in the DSM-5 (American
Psychiatric Association, 2013).

•

Difficulty relaxing and enjoying things: This is a vague characteristic not
linked to any specific diagnosis. Any individual with any mental health or
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physical health diagnosis, depending on diagnostic severity, could report this
characteristic.
•

Relational difficulties with significant other: This is a vague characteristic not
linked to any specific diagnosis. Any individual with any mental health or
physical health diagnosis, depending on diagnostic severity, could report this
characteristic.

•

Irritability and anger: This symptom is frequently associated with a variety of
diagnoses including depression, PTSD, and bipolar II disorder (American
Psychiatric Association, 2013).

•

Frequent worry and rumination: Patterns that reflect anxious anticipation or
repetitive and negative thinking styles are also not unique to any specific
diagnosis, but are reported by individuals with anxiety, depression, mild
mania, PTSD and bereavement. Note: in order to avoid a direct correlation to
the PTSD symptom of intrusive thoughts, there is no mention or description of
thought intrusion.

Study participants (described below) were invited to assess a clinical vignette and
answer a diagnostic survey based upon their interpretation of the symptoms presented.
The clinicians were randomly assigned to one of two vignettes, one with history of
military service and one without history of military service. Our experimental group
(those receiving a vignette with a history of military service) is designated Group A while
the other, control, group is designated Group B. For the purpose of balance, the Group B
vignette included a description that the client was a school teacher. The vignette and the
post-vignette survey questions are presented in Appendix A.
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Sample Size and Recruitment
Recruitment email requests were sent to Association for Behavioral and Cognitive
Therapies member-only listserv and National Council for Behavioral Health memberorganization email distribution list. Recruitment requests were also posted on social
media, including the following Facebook group pages: Military Social Work, Association
of Professional Social Work, Military Mental Health Providers, American Psychological
Association Division 19 (Military Psychology), American Psychological Association
public group. Respondents were all offered the opportunity to be entered into a
sweepstakes for one of 10 $50 electronic Amazon gift-cards for participating.
Power Analysis
Studies of the effect of bias and heuristics on diagnoses of mental illness using
vignettes similar to that proposed in the current study have reported effect sizes ranging
from small to large depending on the bias or heuristic under study. The number of
diagnostic criteria and the addition of criteria deemed important to the diagnosis were
found to have large effects on diagnosis (Bruchmuller & Meyer, 2009; Wolkenstein,
Bruchmüller, Schmid, & Meyer, 2011). However, therapeutic approach (Bruchmuller &
Meyer, 2009) and the gender of the patient (Høye, Rezvy, Hansen, & Olstad, 2006) were
found to have small effects on diagnosis. In order to assure the sample size needed for the
power to detect the effect of the variables of interest on diagnostic decisions using
vignettes, two power analyses were conducted. The first was conducted to identify the
sample size needed to detect a difference between two independent proportions, or the
difference in diagnosis between the experimental and control groups with or without the
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addition of a military history. Based on previous literature, a large effect was assumed
and used in Cohen’s power table with a p < 0.05 and a power of 0.80, identifying a
sample size of n=25 per group or a total sample of N=50 (Cohen, 1992). The second
analysis was conducted to identify the sample size needed to explore the moderating
effect of respondent license type/status and era trained (under DSM-IV or DSM-5) on
diagnosis with or without the addition of a military history. Based on previous literature,
a small effect on the difference between two independent proportions was assumed and
used in Cohen’s power table, a p < 0.05, and a power of 0.80, which identified a sample
size of n=392 per group for a total sample of N=784.
Inclusion Criteria
Participation was limited to English-speaking adults who graduated from a
professional, clinical mental health program, with a minimum of a master’s degree.
Acceptable degrees included counseling, psychology, social work, marriage and family
therapy, psychiatric nursing, and psychiatry. Participants were required to have
completed at least one full graduate course in diagnostic assessment of mental health
disorders. This survey was open to clinically licensed professionals with provisional or
full licenses, as well as graduates of clinical mental health programs who had not yet
obtained their provisional license. Licensure status was self-reported and was not
verified. See Appendix B for the Letter of Invitation.
Eligibility Questions (these were included in the invitation email directly above
the link to the survey):
•

I have completed a graduate program in a clinical (mental health) program: y/n
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•

I have completed at least one full graduate course in the assessment and diagnosis
of mental health disorders: y/n
Setting: This was an online study consisting of a single survey. A direct link to the

survey was provided through email and social media recruitment.
Randomization
Using Qualtrics, one group of randomly assigned clinicians, Group A, received
the case presentation in which the “client” was identified as a “veteran.” The second
group of randomly assigned clinicians, Group B, received an identical symptom report
but the client was identified as a “school teacher.” Random assignment was set for a 1-to1 distribution. Standardized response options were provided in an effort to gather
consistent and interpretable data. Randomization occurred after respondents provided
Informed Consent via electronic signature.
Measures
Participants were asked to report anonymously on demographic and professional
data, including: licensure status, time in practice, DSM training, highest degree achieved
and in what field, theoretical orientation, practice experience with populations, practice
experience with disorders, current practice setting, gender identification, and ethnicity.
Standardized answers were provided where applicable to facilitate exploratory analysis.
Immediately following the vignette, respondents were asked to answer the
questions shown in Figure 2.1.
Human subjects
This was a fully voluntary and anonymous online survey delivered to a
professional population. There was no personally identifiable information about
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participants associated with their survey responses. After completing the survey, all
participants were invited to go to a unique link and enter their email in order to receive a
gift card if selected. The email addresses were not linked to any survey responses and a
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Question 1.
Based upon the vignette you have just read, please identify the primary
diagnosis you would first consider for this client. Because you have been
provided intentionally limited data, please extrapolate to the best of your
ability, a single diagnosis from the list below you feel best reflects the client’s
presentation.
o Anxiety Disorder
o Bipolar I Disorder
o Bipolar II Disorder
o Borderline Personality Disorder
o Major Depressive Disorder
o Persistent Depressive Disorder (formerly Dysthymic Disorder)
o Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
Question 2.
Please select up to 3 diagnoses you would pursue in further assessment as
possible rule-outs, or "No rule-outs":
o Anxiety Disorder
o Bipolar I Disorder
o Bipolar II Disorder
o Borderline Personality Disorder
o Major Depressive Disorder
o Persistent Depressive Disorder (formerly Dysthymic Disorder)
o Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
o No rule-outs
Question 3.
Please select which diagnoses, if any, you feel are not supported by any
information presented in the vignette, or "No selection". There is no limit to
the number of diagnoses you may select.
o Anxiety Disorder
o Bipolar I Disorder
o Bipolar II Disorder
o Borderline Personality Disorder
o Major Depressive Disorder
o Persistent Depressive Disorder (formerly Dysthymic Disorder)
o Posttraumatic Stress Disorder

o No
Figure
2.1selection
Survey Questions for Primary Diagnosis, Rule-outs and Not
Supported Diagnoses Based on Vignette Presentation
blinded process allowed for participants to share their email without risk of personally
identifying data being associated with their survey responses. Survey vignettes did not
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include any confidential information about a real individual. There were minimal risks
associated with participation. Informed consent was signed electronically by participants
through Qualtrics prior to beginning survey (see Appendix C). These procedures were
approved by the University of Pennsylvania Institutional Review Board.
Analysis Plan
The first set of the analyses was conducted to describe the sample as a whole.
Frequencies were run for categorical and binary variable and descriptive statistics
(means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum values) were run to describe
continuous variables.
Hypothesis Testing
Logistic regression analyses were conducted to test the hypotheses that the
experimental group (Group A) would have a higher proportion of providers who select
PTSD (309.81) as the code corresponding to the clinical presentation or list PTSD as a
rule-out option compared to the control group (Group B). If NA is the total size of group
A and DA is the number of providers in group A who gave PTSD as their diagnostic code
or rule-out option, the calculated proportion is PA = DA / NA; similarly for group B (the
control group): PB = DB / NB. The hypothesized difference between groups in selecting
PTSD is predicted based on the presence of disclosure of history of military service as
part of the experimental vignette but not the control vignette, which was expected to
increase the likelihood that PTSD will be diagnosed: PA > PB.
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Dummy Variables
Prior to hypothesis testing, dummy variables for PTSD as a primary diagnosis and
PTSD as a rule-out were created to transform categorical variables into binary variables
for logistic regression analyses:
PTSD Diagnosis (DV)
To compare whether a PTSD diagnosis was chosen or not, a binary variable was
created, with the response option “Posttraumatic Stress Disorder” coded as 1 and all other
response options (Major Depressive Disorder, Persistent Depressive Disorder, Anxiety
Disorder, Bipolar I and Bipolar II Disorders, and Borderline Personality Disorder) coded
as 0.
PTSD Selected as rule-out option (DV)
To compare whether PTSD was selected as a rule-out option or not in the case
that it was not selected as the primary diagnosis, a binary variable was created with value
1 if response option “Posttraumatic Stress Disorder” was selected as a rule-out and 0 if it
was not.
Equivalency of Experimental and Control Groups
Of the sample of 366 clinicians who participated in the study, 187 (51%) were
randomized to the experimental group (vignette with client identified as a Veteran) and
179 (49%) randomized into the control group (vignette with client identified as a
Teacher). Chi-square tests of independence were performed to assess the equivalence of
the experimental and control groups on all categorical variables (Licensure status, DSM
training, Field of Highest Degree, Education Level, Theoretical Orientation, Practice
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Experience with Populations, Practice Experience with Disorders, Current Practice
Setting, Gender Identification, and Ethnicity) and binary regression analysis was
conducted on the single continuous variable (years in practice).
The complete set of chi-square tables and binary regression analysis is provided in
Appendix D. No significant differences were found between the experimental (Veteran)
and control (Teacher) groups on any characteristic except for theoretical orientation (see
Table D.5).

Exploratory Analysis
Since the required sample size as indicated by the power analysis was not
reached, analysis of the moderators was exploratory. Exploratory analysis was conducted
to determine if clinician characteristics including Licensure status, DSM training, Field of
Highest Degree, Education Level, and Theoretical Orientation acted as moderators of any
effect of history of military service on selection of diagnosis of PTSD. To do this, a series
of 3-way chi-square tables were used to layer clinician characteristics on the original
group diagnosis test used in hypothesis testing. Differences between clinician
characteristic sub-groups within experimental and control groups on diagnosis of PTSD
were considered evidence for moderation.
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Chapter 3: Results
Sample Characteristics
A total of 366 clinicians with an average of 11 years of practice experience
(sd=9.25) participated in the study. Seventy five percent (n=276) of participants reported
being licensed, 70% (n=255) reported being trained at the Masters level, just over half
reported having a degree in social work [56% (n=206)], and almost half reported having a
cognitive-behavioral theoretical orientation [45% (n=165)]. Thirty four percent (n=126)
of participants reported being trained using the fourth version of the Diagnostic and
Statistics Manual (DSM-IV) and 35% (n=128) reported being trained using both the
fourth (DSM-IV) and fifth versions (DSM-5), with a smaller percentage trained only on
the DSM-5 [24% (n=86)]. See Table 3.1 for more details.
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Table 3.1 Educational, Training and Theoretical Background of Study Participants

License Held

DSM Training

Degree

Education

Theoretical
Orientation

Variable
Fully Licensed
Unlicensed or
Provisionally Licensed
DSM-IV
DSM-5
Both DSM-IV and DSM-5
Neither or DSM-III
Social Work
Psychology
Counseling
Nursing
Psychiatry
Bachelors
Masters
Doctoral
Cognitive-Behavioral
Eclectic
Humanistic / Person
Centered
Psychodynamic
I do not have a primary
orientation
Other

Frequency
276

Percent
75.41

90

24.59

126
86
128
26
206
104
38
10
8
9
255
102
165
58

34.43
23.50
34.97
7.10
56.28
28.42
10.38
2.73
2.19
2.46
69.67
27.87
45.08
15.85

43

11.75

29

7.92

47

12.84

24

6.56

Participants reported a range of specialized clinical practice experience and
current practice settings. As shown in Table 3.2, approximately half of the participants
reported having specialized practice experience which included children/adolescents
[53% (n=192)], followed by families/couples [43% (n=158)], and women [47% (n=172)].
The most common disorders participants reported having specialized practice experience
with included trauma disorders [73% (n =268)], serious and persistent mental illness
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[52% (n=191)], followed by affective disorders [52% (n=187)]. Respondents worked in a
diverse set of practice settings with about a quarter working in private practice [24%
(n=87)] settings with groups and individuals.
Table 3.2 Study Participants' Practice Experiences (Treated Populations, Disorders
and Current Practice Settings)
Variable
Child/Adolescents
College Students
Families/Couples
Gerontology
Population
LGBT
Veteran/Military
Women
Other
Affective Disorders
Compulsive / Addictive
Eating Disorders
Health Psychology
Disorders Serious and Persistent Mental Illness
Personality Disorders
Substance Abuse
Trauma
Other
Individual or Group Private Practice
Non-Gov Healthcare System, Inpatient or
Outpatient
City, County or State MH Services
Setting
Federal Agency (VA, DoD, BIA, etc)
Non-Profit Organization
School (through 12th grade)
College or University Counseling Center
Other

Frequency Percent
192
52.46
116
31.69
158
43.17
66
18.03
85
23.22
125
34.15
172
46.99
58
15.85
187
51.09
104
28.42
33
9.02
74
20.22
191
52.19
152
41.53
152
41.53
268
73.22
40
10.93
87
23.80
63

17.20

33
59
72
13
9
30

9.00
16.10
19.70
3.60
2.50
8.20

As shown in Table 3.3, the majority of the sample identified as female [85%
(n=311)] and most reported being of White/European descent [79% (n=288)].
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Table 3.3 Demographic Characteristics of Study Participants
Variable
Frequency Percent
Female
311
84.97
Gender ID Male
54
14.75
Non-Conforming
1
0.27
Asian
6
1.64
Black / African-American
25
6.83
Hispanic / Latinx
19
5.19
Ethnicity
Pacific Islander
1
0.27
White / European
288
78.69
Multi-ethnic
20
5.46
Prefer not to answer
7
1.91

Vignette Diagnosis
As shown in Table 3.4, the disorders most commonly identified for the primary
diagnosis across both groups included Anxiety Disorder [30% (n=108)], Major
Depressive Disorder [30% (n=108)], and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder [29% (n=106)].
Two-thirds of participants reported Anxiety Disorders as a rule-out diagnoses [64%
(n=233)], with over half also reporting Major Depressive Disorder [57% (n=207)], and
almost half listing Posttraumatic Stress Disorder [48% (n=177)].
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Table 3.4 Primary and Rule-out Diagnoses For Total Sample
Variable
Frequency Percent
Anxiety Disorder
108
29.51
Bipolar I Disorder
3
0.82
Bipolar II Disorder
6
1.64
Diagnosis Borderline Personality Disorder
8
2.19
Major Depressive Disorder
108
29.51
Persistent Depressive Disorder
27
7.38
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
106
28.96
Anxiety Disorder
233
63.66
Bipolar I Disorder
42
11.48
Bipolar II Disorder
77
21.04
Borderline Personality Disorder
53
14.48
Rule-out
Major Depressive Disorder
207
56.56
Persistent Depressive Disorder
122
33.33
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
177
48.36
No Rule-outs
11
3.01

Experiment v Control: PTSD as Primary Diagnosis
Figure 3.1 summarizes the frequencies of primary diagnoses for the experimental
(Veteran vignette) and control (Teacher vignette) groups. The category “All Other” is
composed of diagnoses of Anxiety, Bipolar I and II Disorders, Borderline Personality
Disorder and Persistent Depressive Disorder.
Of the 187 clinicians presented with the Veteran vignette, 84 (45%) identified
PTSD as their primary diagnosis, while only 22 (12%) of those presented with the
Teacher vignette identified PTSD as their primary diagnosis. Further, 44 (24%) and 42
(22%) of the clinicians presented with the Veteran vignette identified Anxiety Disorder
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Figure 3.1 Primary Diagnosis Frequencies by Group Assignment
and Major Depressive Disorder respectively, compared to 64 (36%) and 66 (37%) of the
clinicians presented with the Teacher vignette.
Logistic regression analysis was conducted to test the likelihood that group
assignment (Veteran versus Teacher) would predict the selection of PTSD as the primary
diagnosis (Table 3.5). Cases in which the client was identified as a Veteran were almost 6
times more likely to be given a primary diagnosis of PTSD than cases in which the client
was identified as a Teacher [OR=5.82, p=0.00].

Table 3.5 Logistic Regression of the Likelihood of Selecting PTSD as the Primary
Diagnosis in the Experimental Versus Control Group
95% C.I. for OR
Odds Ratio p-value Lower Upper
Group Assignment 5.82
0.00
3.42
9.90
Constant
0.14
0.00
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Experimental v Control: PTSD as a Rule-Out Diagnosis
Logistic regression analysis was conducted to test the likelihood that group
assignment (Veteran versus Teacher vignette) would predict the identification of PTSD
as a rule-out diagnosis. As shown in Table 3.6, the odds of reporting PTSD as a rule-out
diagnosis were not significantly greater for clinicians assigned to the experimental
(Veteran) group than those assigned to the control (Teacher) group [OR=0.69, p=0.08].

Table 3.6 Logistic Regression of the Likelihood of Identifying PTSD as a Rule-out
Disorder in the Experimental Versus Control Group
95% C.I. for OR
Odds Ratio p-value Lower Upper
Group Assignment 0.69
0.08
0.46
1.04
Constant
1.13
0.41

Exploratory Analysis
Exploratory analysis was conducted to test the possibility that clinician
characteristics, including Licensure, DSM Training, Field of Highest Degree, Education
Level, or Theoretical Orientation would act as moderators of the effect of group
assignment (Veteran versus Teacher) on the selection of PTSD as the primary diagnosis.
Only those clinician characteristics with significant results are reported.
Licensure. As seen in Table 3.7, more licensed clinicians assigned the Veteran
vignette diagnosed the client with PTSD (Std. Residuals = 3.8) than would be expected,
suggesting that the client characteristic of “Veteran” impacted the licensed clinicians’
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decision to select PTSD as the primary diagnosis. Fewer licensed clinicians assigned the
Teacher vignette diagnosed the client with PTSD (Std. Residuals = -3.9) and more
diagnosed the client with Major Depressive Disorder (Std. Residuals = 2.0) than would be
expected, suggesting that the client characteristic of “Teacher” also impacted licensed
clinicians’ diagnostic decisions. No more or fewer provisionally/unlicensed clinicians
diagnosed the client with PTSD whether assigned the Veteran (Std. Residuals = 1.3) or
Teacher vignette (Std. Residuals = -1.3).
Overall, it appears that being fully licensed impacted the selection of PTSD as the
primary diagnosis based on client characteristics, while being unlicensed or provisionally
licensed did not. These findings suggest a moderating effect of licensure status on the
effect that client characteristics have on the diagnosis of PTSD.
Table 3.7 Chi-Square Test of Independence of Experimental Versus Control Groups
on Selecting PTSD as the Primary Diagnosis by Licensure Status
Random Assignment
Teacher
License Held

Fully Licensed

Diagnosis

Count

(Std Res)

Veteran
Count

(Std Res)

Anxiety

48

(1.7)

30

(-1.6)

Bipolar

5

(1.2)

1

(-1.2)

Depression

61

(2.0)

37

(-1.9)

PTSD

17

(-3.9)

71

(3.8)

Chi-square (3, N=270) = 0.30, p = 0.00

Unlicensed or
Provisionally
Licensed

Anxiety

16

(0.3)

14

(-0.3)

Bipolar

2

(0.4)

1

(-0.4)

21

(0.6)

16

(-0.6)

5

(-1.3)

13

(1.3)

Depression
PTSD

Chi-square (3, N=88) = 0.30, p = 0.00
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DSM Training. As seen in Table 3.8, more clinicians trained using DSM-IV
assigned to the Veteran vignette diagnosed the client with PTSD (Std. Residuals = 2.8)
than would be expected by chance, suggesting that the client characteristic of “Veteran”
impacted the DSM-IV trained clinicians’ decision to select PTSD as the primary
diagnosis. Fewer clinicians trained using DSM-IV assigned the “Teacher” vignette
diagnosed the client with PTSD (Std. Residuals = -2.8) than would be expected by
chance, suggesting that the client characteristic of “Teacher” also impacted the DSM-IV
trained clinicians’ decision to not use PTSD as the primary diagnosis.
No more or fewer clinicians trained using DSM-5 diagnosed the client with PTSD
whether they were assigned the “Veteran” (Std. Residuals = 1.4) or “Teacher” (Std.
Residuals = -1.4) vignette than would be expected by chance, suggesting that client
characteristics did not impact the DSM-5 trained clinicians’ decisions to use PTSD as the
primary diagnosis.
More clinicians trained using both DSM-IV and DSM-5 assigned the Veteran
vignette diagnosed the client with PTSD (Std. Residuals = 2.5) than would be expected
by chance, suggesting that the client characteristic of “Veteran” impacted the DSMIV/DSM-5 trained clinicians’ decision to use PTSD as the primary diagnosis. Fewer
clinicians assigned to the Teacher vignette trained using both DSM-IV and DSM-5
diagnosed the client with PTSD (Std. Residuals = -2.3) than would be expected by
chance, suggesting that the client characteristic of “Teacher” impacted the DSMIV/DSM-5 trained clinicians’ decision to not select PTSD as the primary diagnosis.
Overall, it appears that being trained on the DSM-IV, whether alone or with the
DSM-5, increases the likelihood of selecting PTSD as the primary diagnosis based on
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client characteristics. It does not appear to be the case for clinicians trained using only the
DSM-5. These findings suggest that the version of the DSM with which clinicians were
trained moderated the effect of client characteristics on selecting PTSD as the primary
diagnosis.

Table 3.8 Chi-Square Test of Independence of Experimental Versus Control Group
on Selecting PTSD as the Primary Diagnosis by DSM Training
Random Assignment
Teacher
Training

DSM-IV

Diagnosis

Count

(Std Res)

Veteran
Count

(Std Res)

Anxiety

26

(1.5)

13

(-1.5)

Bipolar

1

(0.7)

0

(-0.7)

28

(1.0)

19

(-1.0)

6

(-2.8)

30

(2.8)

Depression
PTSD

Chi-square (3, N=123) = 0.35, p = 0.00

DSM-5

Anxiety

16

(0.9)

11

(-0.8)

Bipolar

1

(-0.4)

2

(0.3)

18

(0.3)

17

(-0.3)

5

(-1.3)

14

(1.3)

Depression
PTSD

Chi-square (3, N=84) = 0.20, p = 0.07

Both DSM-IV and DSM-5

Anxiety

19

(0.2)

15

(-0.3)

Bipolar

5

(1.5)

0

(-1.5)

Depression

32

(1.4)

15

(-1.5)

PTSD

10

(-2.3)

29

(2.5)

Chi-square (3, N=26) = 0.22, p = 0.01

Theoretical Orientation. As seen in Table 3.9, more clinicians with a CognitiveBehavioral orientation assigned to the Veteran vignette diagnosed the client with PTSD
(Std. Residuals = 3.3) than would be expected by chance, suggesting that the client
52

Crystal Shelton
characteristic of “Veteran” impacted the Cognitive-Behavioral oriented clinicians’
decision to use PTSD as the primary diagnosis. Fewer clinicians with a CognitiveBehavioral orientation assigned the Teacher vignette diagnosed the client with PTSD
(Std. Residuals = -3.4) than would be expected by chance, suggesting that the client
characteristic of “Teacher” impacted the Cognitive-Behavioral orientated clinicians’
decision to not use PTSD as the primary diagnosis.
No more or fewer clinicians with an Eclectic orientation assigned the Veteran
vignette diagnosed the client with PTSD (Std. Residuals = 1.9) than would be expected
by chance, suggesting that the client characteristic of “Veteran” did not impact the
Eclectic oriented clinicians’ decision to use PTSD as the primary diagnosis. Fewer
clinicians with an Eclectic orientation assigned to the Teacher vignette diagnosed the
client with PTSD (Std. Residuals = -2.2) than would be expected, suggesting that the
client characteristic of “Teacher” impacted the Eclectic oriented clinicians’ decision to
use or not use PTSD as the primary diagnosis.
No more or fewer clinicians with a Human/Person Centered orientation diagnosed
the client with PTSD whether they were assigned the Veteran (Std. Residuals=0.4) or
Teacher (Std. Residuals= -0.5) than would be expected by chance, suggesting that client
characteristics did not impact the Human/Person Centered clinicians’ decision to use or
not use PTSD as the primary diagnosis.
No more or fewer clinicians with a Psychodynamic orientation diagnosed the
client with PTSD whether they were assigned the Veteran (Std. Residuals = 0.9) or
Teacher (Std. Residuals = -0.9) than would be expected, suggesting that the client
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characteristic did not impact the Psychodynamic oriented clinicians’ decision to use or
not use PTSD as the primary diagnosis.
Overall, it appears that having a Cognitive-Behavioral orientation increases the
likelihood of diagnosing PTSD based on the Veteran client characteristic. It does not
appear to be the case for those with an Eclectic, Humanistic/Person Centered or
Psychodynamic orientation. These findings suggest a moderating effect of theoretical
orientation on the impact of client characteristics on the diagnosis of PTSD.
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Table 3.9 Chi-Square Test of Independence of Experimental Versus Control Groups
on Selecting PTSD as the Primary Diagnosis by Theoretical Orientation
Random Assignment
Teacher
Orientation

Cognitive-Behavioral

Diagnosis

Count

(Std Res)

Veteran
Count

(Std Res)

Anxiety

30

(1.4)

17

(-1.4)

Bipolar

3

(1.3)

0

(-1.2)

38

(1.6)

22

(-1.5)

8

(-3.4)

43

(3.3)

Depression
PTSD

Chi-square (3, N=161) = 0.34, p = 0.00
Anxiety
Eclectic

Depression
PTSD

8

(0.7)

7

(-0.6)

13

(1.7)

7

(-1.4)

2

(-2.3)

19

(1.9)

Chi-square (3, N=56) = 0.10, p = 0.00

Humanistic /
Person Centered

Anxiety

6

(-0.2)

9

(0.1)

Bipolar

0

(-0.7)

1

(0.6)

Depression

8

(0.8)

6

(-0.7)

PTSD

4

(-0.5)

8

(0.4)

Chi-square (3, N=42) = -0.10, p = 0.89

Psychodynamic

Anxiety

6

(0.3)

5

(-0.3)

Bipolar

1

(0.7)

0

(-0.7)

Depression

5

(0.3)

4

(-0.3)

PTSD

2

(-0.9)

6

(0.9)

Chi-square (3, N=22) = 0.27, p = 0.24
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Chapter 4: Discussion and Conclusion
This study set out to test the impact of a single non-symptom variable on mental
health diagnosis. We sought to identify, specifically, if the designation of “veteran” or
“teacher” in an otherwise identical case presentation would impact diagnosis. The study
vignettes were drafted such that symptoms were described vaguely, and made no mention
of traumatic exposure, arguably the cornerstone symptom of PTSD and it was
hypothesized that the designation of “veteran” would lead to higher diagnoses of PTSD
than would the designation of “teacher”. The hypothesis was supported: case vignettes
where the client was identified as a veteran were 6-times more likely to be diagnosed
with PTSD than those vignettes where the client was identified as a teacher. Additional
findings of interest indicated clinicians’ diagnostic judgement were moderated by time in
practice and professional training in DSM and Cognitive-Behavioral Theoretical
Orientation.
It is potentially not surprising that study participants would read the vignette
about a veteran seeking treatment for vague mental health concerns and select PTSD as
the likely issue. PTSD has routinely been described as the signature injury of OEF/OIF.
The psychological impact of war has been studied extensively, with a significant portion
of research focusing specifically on posttraumatic stress disorder. But the strength of the
relationship between the variables of “veteran” and “PTSD” point to some of the current
challenges in veteran’s mental health care. Service members and veterans have been
found to experience depressive and anxiety disorders at an equal, if not greater, rate to
PTSD (Deployment Health Clinical Center, Defense Centers of Excellence for
Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury Center, 2017).
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Though PTSD prevalence rates are controversial and varied, the epidemiological
data typically supports depression and PTSD occurring at an equivalent rate (Ramchand,
Rudavsky, Grant, Tanielian, & Jaycox, 2015). If evidence-based treatments for PTSD
were identical to evidence-based treatments for other common disorders in military
personnel, effectively differentiating between disorders might not be as essential. This
isn’t the case. Effective treatments for PTSD are significantly different from evidencebased treatments for depression and therefore effective diagnostic differentiation is
essential.
There are a number of factors that might contribute to the strength of association
between “veteran” and “PTSD.” In this study, three-quarters of the study participants
reported having primary experience treating trauma-related disorders. The relationship
between the high number of clinicians identifying PTSD for a veteran vignette and the
high number of clinicians reporting trauma-focused clinical practice is non-trivial. As
noted earlier in this paper, “representativeness” was one of the earliest heuristics
described. Understood this way, veteran status represents a potentially trauma-exposed
individual more than teacher status. With clinical heuristics and bias well documented in
the literature, the findings here add evidence that veteran status has a powerful effect on
diagnosis, disproportionately impacting diagnosis beyond the scope of clinical cues
presented in the vignette. As noted previously, doctors and clinicians routinely use
shortcuts in critical thinking in order to be able to sort through large volumes of
information and make diagnostic assessments and determinations based on limited data.
One question for future research then is, is veteran status becoming a functioning
heuristic for PTSD?
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In the exploratory analysis we found the impact of veteran status on the diagnosis
of PTSD was moderated by clinician characteristics associated with training and
licensure. Licensed clinicians assigned the veteran vignette were significantly more likely
to diagnose PTSD than unlicensed clinicians assigned the same vignette. These findings
are also consistent with early research of diagnostic accuracy based on time in practice.
As noted earlier in this paper, clinical judgment is varied and not directly related to time
in practice or training background. Clinicians do not necessarily become more accurate
over time and instead, possibly become less likely to integrate new findings and new
practice guidelines into their practice as they become habitual and entrenched in clinical
patterns.
Clinicians assigned the veteran vignette who were trained using DSM-IV were
significantly more likely to diagnose PTSD than clinicians presented with the same
vignette who trained under the DSM-5. Clinicians trained under DSM-5 were not swayed
by the inclusion of veteran status and did not appear to mis-categorize it as symptom
data. The neutrality through which clinicians trained specifically under DSM-5 viewed
veteran status supports arguments made by the DSM-5 working group on PTSD that
clearer definitions of a traumatic stressor, or Criterion A event, were needed and would
limit diagnostic variability (Friedman, 2013).
There are a number of reasons it is important to understand how veteran status
might impact clinical diagnosis. While it would be impossible to have a discussion of
veterans’ mental health without a significant focus on PTSD, it remains that depression,
anxiety, and TBI are all significant issues, with depression occurring at rates equal or
greater than PTSD for veterans. In spite of well-validated diagnostic and assessment tools
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and evidence-based treatments, PTSD diagnosis and treatment can be challenging. It
should help that a PTSD diagnosis requires a specific event, a stressor of significant and
well-described magnitude, and the subsequent symptoms are nosologically related to the
traumatic event. That said, the respondents in this study did not find the absence of a
traumatic event essential.
Future research is required to better understand to what extent the traumatic
stressor criterion is actually valued in real world practice. Further, it is an interesting
question of what drives the association of veteran status with PTSD. Veterans who have
deployed have a higher traumatic-event exposure prevalence, and this may lead to some
automatic associations for clinicians, in spite of the moderate-to-low likelihood that
trauma exposure leads to PTSD. It is also possible that clinicians are guided by beliefs
about military and combat that inform their clinical judgment and assume a high
prevalence of trauma.
Even without having a clear understanding of the reasons behind the causal
linkage between “veteran” and “PTSD,” these findings point to the importance of the use
of validated assessment measures in diagnosis. Incorporation of objective assessment
measures can improve diagnostic accuracy across DSM categories. Specific to PTSD
objective, validated assessment tools such as the Clinician Administered PTSD Scale, the
Life-Events Checklist, and the Combat Exposure Scale should be broadly considered as a
means of limiting subjectivity in the diagnostic process (Weathers, Blake, Schnurr,
Kaloupek, Marx & Keane, 2012; Weathers, Blake, Schnurr, Kaloupek, Marx & Keane,
2013; Keane, Fairbank, Caddell, Zimering, Taylor, Mora 1989). As noted in a thorough
evaluation of practices and attitudes in the assessment of PTSD, there is wide variability
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in how clinicians assess for PTSD, with a significant majority responding that they are
unlikely to use validated assessment measures (Jackson et., al., 2011). But these findings
imply that the absence of an index trauma, at least in an initial clinical assessment, is
under-valued as important or relevant clinical information.
An emphasis on validated assessment measures is important from a policy
perspective, as well. Disability awards for PTSD far exceed all other mental health
disability ratings associated with military service (Marx, et al., 2016). A number of
studies have outlined PTSD-specific challenges in the current VA disability benefits
process. During a 2005 review conducted by the VA Office of the Inspector General,
25% of the veterans awarded disability pensions for PTSD were lacking compelling
medical evidence, including evidence of exposure to combat or trauma during military
service (Freuh, Grubaugh, Elhai, & Buckley, 2007). The Compensation and Pension
(C&P) has been scrutinized for not consistently adhering to best practice guidelines in
evidence-based assessment, including validated assessment measures and Structured
Clinical Interviews (Institute of Medicine, 2007; Russo, 2014). In an evaluation of the
extent to which veterans service connection status corresponded to their diagnostic status
researchers noted an alarming discordance between diagnostic and service connection
status (Marx, et al., 2016).
While there have been ample studies conducted over the last two decades
evaluating potential symptom overreporting and malingering by veterans seeking PTSD
compensation, the present study findings support additional analysis on clinician-driven
factors in diagnostic variation of PTSD. Clinicians conducting disability benefit
assessments are responsible for identifying the experience that qualifies as meeting the
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threshold for criterion A. The findings of this study, at least preliminarily, point to a more
complex systematic issue than simple symptom over-reporting. Clinician characteristics
and clinical practice approach might have a significant impact on the current state of the
disability rating system for PTSD particularly if clinicians are not objectively valuing the
presence or absence of a traumatic-stressor.
Implications for Social Work Practice
Social work education has long been involved in improving resources and care
available to veterans and service members. In 2010 the Council on Social Work
Education (CSWE) published guidelines for advanced practice in military social work.
The core competencies described were updated again in 2018 (CSWE, 2018). Military
social work and social work education in general has been responsible for significant
improvements in programming, intervention, assessment and services. The CSWE
guidelines reference the ethical responsibilities held by institutions focusing on military
social work practice. The guidelines note the importance of:
Balancing a strength-based treatment orientation with an increasingly
disability-focused benefit system. There is an incredibly complex situation
that continues to grow and morph around service-related disabilities and
lifetime disability ratings for PTSD. Within this complex issue there are
micro, mezzo, and macro challenges; questions about ethics; and questions
about how our own beliefs and worldviews might affect how we care for
our wounded, ill, and injured veterans (CSWE, 2018, p. xix).

61

Crystal Shelton
The present study’s findings support the significant role social work education in general,
and military social work programs specifically in high quality training in clinical
assessment and military-culturally competent care. Programs focused on quality clinical
training should integrate strong emphasis on evidence-based assessment and clinician
awareness of non-clinical factors and how they impact diagnostic decision making.
Clinical training programs should be grounded in the most current and well-supported
evidence.
Study Limitations
This study has several limitations which must be considered when reviewing
these findings. Fictional case vignettes have been identified as helpful in assessing
general clinical decision-making skills, but they do not accurately capture or reflect realworld clinical decision making. It is entirely possible that, while veteran status was
overly-influential in a brief case review, real world diagnostic practice would place more
emphasis on identifying a specific and relevant index trauma and PTSD-specific
symptoms. Literature suggests that surveys and studies relying on clinical vignettes may
be particularly vulnerable to social desirability bias (Peabody, Luck, Glassman,
Dresselhaus, & Lee, 2000). Additionally, because veterans have higher base rates of
trauma exposure than teachers, it is possible the survey results reflect clinicians ‘playing
the odds.’ A single, brief vignette study does not allow for complex analysis of diagnostic
decision making and we are unable to establish if the diagnostic conclusions of our
participants conclusively demonstrate biased thinking or simple probabilistic reasoning.
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The assignment of a profession, teacher, to the control group was intended to
simply balance the vignettes. However, study respondents assigned to the control group,
the “teacher” vignette, selected a diagnosis of depression at a greater rate than would be
expected by chance. Though the survey was initially drafted to isolate veteran status as
the sole variable under examination, it is clear that there is more to learn about the impact
of “profession” in general. Finally, for the purpose of analyzing the moderating impact of
clinician characteristics, the required sample size as indicated by the power analysis was
not reached and analysis of the moderators was exploratory.
Considerations for future research
The findings highlighted the significant extent to which non-clinical factors are
integrated into diagnostic decision-making. Additional research is needed to better
understand the drivers of diagnostic decision making, including clinician and client
characteristics. Future studies should include qualitative assessments of clinicians to
further assess how beliefs about military service influence diagnosis. Moreover, a larger
sample size of a broader range of providers across professional disciplines might be able
to better evaluate what factors influence the weighting of non-symptom information in
early clinical assessment.
Furthermore, a tremendous effort has been undertaken by the Veterans
Administration and DoD to ensure evidence-based treatments are available and specific
to PTSD. Some researchers have used high rates of treatment attrition as evidence that
the treatments themselves are ineffective for a broad population (Steenkamp & Litz,
2014). Our findings support a broader analysis of treatment attrition and dropout to
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evaluate for the possibility that PTSD is at times diagnosed even in the absence of a
qualifying traumatic event, with inappropriate clients subsequently entered into PTSD
treatment.
Conclusion
In spite of the study limitations, the findings support a strong connection between
veteran status and the likelihood of a PTSD diagnosis. Given the continued relevance of
improving treatment access and mental health outcomes for veterans, these present
findings offer support for the utilization of objective assessment measures and ensuring
all diagnostic possibilities are appropriately assessed for. There will be value in
continued research to better understand drivers of clinical decision-making.
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Vignette
A 32-year-old [veteran or school teacher based on randomization] presents for
consultation at a mental health practice. They arrive 15 minutes late and they have not
filled out paperwork that has been previously emailed to them. They appear slightly
irritable when asked to fill out paperwork before seeing the therapist. During the
diagnostic assessment the client reports they are presenting largely at their spouse’s
behest. When asked what the main concerns might be, they note routine difficulty falling
asleep, routinely laying in bed for several hours before falling into a fitful and
intermittent sleep. The client notes waking at every sound and then trouble falling back
asleep. Overall, they report approximately 4-5 hours of sleep per night on average.
During the early part of the assessment the client’s affect remains guarded and
subdued and the interaction is notable for poor eye contact. When asked about further
symptoms the client discloses they have been irritable. They gave an example: recently
while making dinner, the client became frustrated by not being able to locate a commonly
used cooking utensil. They noted they were unable to tolerate growing frustration and
ultimately dumped over a kitchen drawer, causing everything to scatter. At this point the
client reports their spouse came into the kitchen and the client said “They tried to calm
me down, but that just made me angrier. I know they misplaced the spatula and even
though I knew it was an over-reaction, I couldn’t bring myself down. Things like this
happen on occasion and it takes me forever to cool down.”
Further into the assessment, the client reports frequent “overthinking.” The client
described ruminating on past events where they believe they have “messed up” in life and
“let everyone down.” They also described constant worry and a feeling of “waiting for
the worst to happen.” The client does not disclose what they believe the “worst” would
be, and they remain guarded on this point. The issue of anxious and ruminative thoughts
come up throughout the assessment. They client ultimately describes frustration that they
can’t “get myself to stop thinking about things sometimes.”
Overall, they describe significant relational difficulties with their spouse who the
client reports accuses them of being “checked out and always looking for a fight.” By
their own interpretation, they note they feel “detached.” They indicate no current hobbies,
no real desire to do things they previously enjoyed, and they find themselves avoiding
public events and social gatherings, and making excuses to avoid “feeling overwhelmed”
outside of work and home. Their affect remains subdued throughout the assessment.
There is no notable psychomotor agitation, no identified health concerns, and they deny
suicidal ideations.
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Post-Vignette Questions
Question 1.
Based upon the vignette you have just read, please identify the primary diagnosis you
would first consider for this client. Because you have been provided intentionally limited
data, please extrapolate to the best of your ability, a single diagnosis from the list below
you feel best reflects the client’s presentation.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Anxiety Disorder
Bipolar I Disorder
Bipolar II Disorder
Borderline Personality Disorder
Major Depressive Disorder
Persistent Depressive Disorder (formerly Dysthymic Disorder)
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder

Question 2.
Please select up to 3 diagnoses you would pursue in further assessment as possible ruleouts:
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Anxiety Disorder
Bipolar I Disorder
Bipolar II Disorder
Borderline Personality Disorder
Major Depressive Disorder
Persistent Depressive Disorder (formerly Dysthymic Disorder)
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
No rule-outs

Question 3.
Please select which diagnoses, if any, you feel are not supported by any information
presented in the vignette, or “No selection”. There is no limit to the number of diagnoses
you may select.
o
o
o
o
o

Anxiety Disorder
Bipolar I Disorder
Bipolar II Disorder
Borderline Personality Disorder
Major Depressive Disorder
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o Persistent Depressive Disorder (formerly Dysthymic Disorder)
o Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
o No selection
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Letter of Invitation
Clinical Vignette Research Survey

Dear Colleagues:
This email is intended to solicit participation in my dissertation study, a brief, anonymous
online-survey with IRB approval (830104). The purpose of this study is to evaluate
professional decision-making utilizing clinical vignettes. I am seeking clinical
professionals at the masters and doctoral level to participate.
All participants will be entered into a sweepstakes to win one of 10 $50 Amazon gift
cards.
You are eligible to participate in this study if you have received a graduate degree in a
clinical mental health field and completed at least one full graduate course in diagnostic
assessment. You may participate even if you have not yet obtained your clinical license.
Fields of training are not excluded – that is, participants may be psychologists, social
workers, psychiatric nurse practitioners, counselors, or psychiatrists. Time to participate
is expected to take no more than 15 minutes. Participation is entirely anonymous and
voluntary, and you may withdraw at any time.
Eligibility:
• I have completed a graduate program in a clinical (mental health) program: y/n
•

I have taken at least one graduate course in diagnostic assessment of mental
health disorders: y/n

If you have answered yes to the above questions and are willing to participate, please
click on the following link:
[link omitted]
If you have any questions about this study, please contact the PI (Crystal Shelton at
[email omitted]).
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Informed Consent
You are invited to participate in a web-based online survey on vignettes as a clinical
decision-making tool. This is a research project being conducted by Crystal Shelton
[email omitted]. It should take approximately 15 minutes to complete. University of
Pennsylvania IRB protocol number 830104.
PARTICIPATION
Qualified participants will have graduated from a professional, clinical mental health
program, with a minimum of a master’s degree. Acceptable degrees include counseling,
psychology, social work, marriage and family therapy, psychiatric nursing, and
psychiatry. Participants should have completed at least one full graduate course in
diagnostic assessment of mental health disorders. This survey is open to clinically
licensed professionals with provisional or full licenses, as well as graduates of clinical
mental health programs who have not yet obtained their provisional license.
The survey should take approximately 10 minutes to complete. Your participation in this
survey is voluntary. You may refuse to take part in the research or exit the survey at any
time without penalty.
BENEFITS
All participants who complete the survey will be given the opportunity to enter a raffle
for one of 10 $50 Amazon gift cards.
RISKS
There are no foreseeable risks involved in participating in this study other than those
encountered in day-to-day life.
CONFIDENTIALITY
Your survey answers will be sent to a link at Qualtrics.com, where data will be stored in a
password protected electronic format. In order to receive a gift-card, participants will
be asked at the end of the survey to provide the email address this letter was distributed
to. Email addresses are in no way linked to the survey responses and your data will be
completely anonymous.
CONTACT
If you have any general questions about this research or wish to obtain a copy of the
results, please contact the PI: [email omitted]. If you feel you have not been treated
according to the descriptions in this form, or that your rights as a participant in research
have not been honored during the course of this project, or you have any questions,
concerns, or complaints that you wish to address to someone other than the investigator,
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you may contact University of Pennsylvania Institutional Research Board (IRB): [email
omitted].
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Table D.1 Logistic Regression Analysis of the Odds of Being Assigned the
Experimental Group
95% C.I for OR
Odds Ratio p-value Lower Upper
Years in Practice 1.00
0.67
0.97
1.02
Constant
1.10
0.55

Table D.2 Chi-Square Test of Independence of Experiment Versus Control Groups
on Licensure Status
Group Assignment
Teacher Veteran
Count
133
143
Fully Licensed
Std Residual
-0.2
0.2
Count
46
44
Provisionally or Unlicensed
Std Residual
0.3
-0.3
Chi-square (1, N=366) = 0.23, p = 0.63

Table D.3 Chi-Square Test of Independence of Experiment Versus Control Groups
on Version of DSM Training
Group Assignment
Teacher Veteran
Count
62
64
DSM-IV
Std Residual
0
0
Count
42
44
DSM-5
Std Residual
0
0
Count
67
61
DSM-IV and DSM-5
Std Residual
0.6
-0.5
Count
8
18
Neither or DSM-III
Std Residual
-1.3
1.3
Chi-square(3, N=366) = 4.04, p = 0.26
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Table D.4 Chi-Square Test of Independence of Experiment Versus Control Groups
on Field of Highest Degree
Group Assignment
Teacher Veteran
Count
100
106
Social Work
Std Residual
-0.1
0.1
Count
52
52
Psychology
Std Residual
0.2
0.2
Count
19
19
Counseling
Std Residual
0.1
-0.1
Count
4
6
Nursing
Std Residual
-0.4
0.4
Count
4
4
Psychiatry
Std Residual
0.0
0.0
Chi-square(4, N=366) = 400, p = 0.98

Table D.5 Chi-Square Test of Independence of Experiment Versus Control Groups
on Education Level
Group Assignment
Teacher Veteran
Count
2
7
Bachelors
Std Residual
-1.1
1.1
Count
122
133
Masters
Std Residual
-0.2
0.2
Count
55
47
Doctoral
Std Residual
0.7
-0.7
Chi-square(2, N=366) = 3.70, p = 0.16
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Table D.6 Chi-Square Test of Independence of Experiment Versus Control Groups
on Theoretical Orientation
Group Assignment
Teacher Veteran
Count
81
84
Cognitive-Behavioral
Std Residual
0.0
0.0
Count
23
35
Eclectic
Std Residual
-1.0
1.0
Count
19
24
Humanistic / Person Centered
Std Residual
-0.4
0.4
Count
14
15
Psychodynamic
Std Residual
0.0
0.0
Count
21
26
No primary orientation
Std Residual
-0.4
0.4
Count
21
3
Other
Std Residual
2.7
-2.6
Chi-square(5, N=366) = 17.02, p = 0.004

Table D.7 Chi-Square Test of Independence of Experiment Versus Control Groups
on Primary Practice Setting

Count
Std Residual
Non-Gov Healthcare System, Inpatient or
Count
Outpatient
Std Residual
Count
City, County or State MH Services
Std Residual
Count
Federal Agency (VA, DoD, BIA, etc)
Std Residual
Count
Non-Profit Organization
Std Residual
Count
School (through 12th grade)
Std Residual
Count
College or University Counseling Center
Std Residual
Count
Other
Std Residual
Chi-square(7, N=366) = 8.44, p = 0.30
90
Individual or Group Private Practice

Group Assignment
Teacher Veteran
46
41
0.5
-0.5
35
28
0.8
-0.7
19
14
0.7
-0.7
26
33
-0.5
0.5
35
37
0.0
0.0
4
9
-0.9
0.9
2
7
-1.1
1.1
12
18
-0.7
0.7
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Table D.8 Chi-Square Test of Independence of Experiment Versus Control Groups
on Specialized Practice Experience with Populations

Child/Adolescents

College Students

Families/Couples

Gerontology

LGBTQ

Veterans/Military

Women

Other
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Group Assignment
Teacher Veteran
No Count
86
88
Std Residual
0.1
-0.1
Yes Count
93
99
Std Residual
-0.1
0.1
Chi-square(1, N=366) = 0.04, p = 0.85
No Count
112
138
Std Residual
-0.9
0.9
Yes Count
67
49
Std Residual
1.4
-1.3
Chi-square(1, N=366) = 0.53, p = 0.02
No Count
95
113
Std Residual
-0.7
0.7
Yes Count
84
74
Std Residual
0.8
-0.7
Chi-square(1, N=366) = 2.02, p = 0.16
No Count
146
154
Std Residual
-0.1
0.1
Yes Count
33
33
Std Residual
0.1
-0.1
Chi-square(1, N=366) = 0.04, p = .84
No Count
132
149
Std Residual
-0.5
0.5
Yes Count
47
38
Std Residual
0.8
-0.8
Chi-square(1, N=366) = 1.81, p = 0.18
No Count
115
126
Std Residual
-0.3
0.3
Yes Count
64
61
Std Residual
0.4
-0.4
Chi-square(1, N=366) = 0.40, p = 0.53
No Count
85
109
Std Residual
-1.0
1.0
Yes Count
94
78
Std Residual
1.1
-1.1
Chi-square(1, N=366) = 4.29, p = 0.04
No Count
146
162
Std Residual
-0.4
0.4
Yes Count
33
25
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Std Residual
0.9
-0.9
Chi-square(1, N=366) = 1.76, p = 0.19

Table D.9 Chi-Square Test of Independence of Experiment Versus Control Groups
on Specialized Practice Experience with Disorders

No
Affective Disorder

Yes

No
Compulsive and Addictive Behaviors

Yes

No
Eating Disorders

Yes

No
Health Psychology

Yes

No
Serious and Persistent Mental Illness

Yes

No
Personality Disorders

Yes

No
Substance Abuse

Yes

No
Trauma
Yes
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Group Assignment
Teacher
Veteran
Count
83
96
Std Residual -0.5
0.5
Count
96
91
Std Residual 0.5
-0.5
Chi-square(1, N=366) = 0.90, p = 0.34
Count
126
136
Std Residual -0.2
0.2
Count
53
51
Std Residual 0.3
-0.3
Chi-square(1, N=366) = 0.25, p = 0.62
Count
160
173
Std Residual -0.2
0.2
Count
19
14
Std Residual 0.7
-0.7
Chi-square(1, N=366) = 1.09, p = 0.30
Count
146
146
Std Residual 0.3
-0.3
Count
33
41
Std Residual -0.5
0.5
Chi-square(1, N=366) = 0.69, p = 0.41
Count
86
89
Std Residual 0.0
0.0
Count
93
98
Std Residual 0.0
0.0
Chi-square(1, N=366) = 0.007, p = 0.93
Count
101
113
Std Residual -0.4
0.4
Count
78
74
Std Residual 0.4
-0.4
Chi-square(1, N=366) = 0.60, p = 0.44
Count
104
110
Std Residual -0.9
0.8
Count
75
77
Std Residual 0.1
-0.1
Chi-square(1, N=366) = 0.02, p = 0.89
Count
42
56
Std Residual -0.9
0.8
Count
137
131
Std Residual 0.5
-0.5
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No
Other
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Yes

Chi-square(1, N=366) = 1.96, p = 0.16
Count
159
167
Std Residual 0.0
0.0
Count
20
20
Std Residual 0.1
-0.1
Chi-square(1, N=366) = 0.02, p = .88
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Table E.1 Chi-Square Test of Independence of Experiment Versus Control Groups
on Selecting PTSD as the Primary Diagnosis by Licensure Status
Group Assignment
License Held
Diagnosis
Teacher Veteran
Count
48
30
Anxiety Disorder
Std Residual
1.7
-1.6
Count
2
0
Bipolor I Disorder
Std Residual
1.1
-1.0
Count
3
1
Bipolar II Disorder
Std Residual
0.8
-0.7
Borderline Personality Count
2
4
Std Residual
-0.5
0.5
Fully Licensed Disorder
Major Depressive
Count
51
29
Disorder
Std Residual
2.0
-1.9
Persistent Depressive Count
10
8
Disorder
Std Residual
0.5
-0.4
Count
17
71
PTSD
Std Residual
-3.9
3.8
Chi-square(6, N=276) = 46.96, p = 0.00
Count
16
14
Anxiety Disorder
Std Residual
0.2
-0.2
Count
1
0
Bipolor I Disorder
Std Residual
0.7
-0.7
Count
1
1
Bipolar II Disorder
Std Residual
0.0
0.0
2
0
Unlicensed or Borderline Personality Count
Disorder
Std Residual
1.0
-1.0
Provisionally
Licensed
Major Depressive
Count
15
13
Disorder
Std Residual
0.2
-0.2
Persistent Depressive Count
6
3
Disorder
Std Residual
0.7
-0.7
Count
5
13
PTSD
Std Residual
-1.4
1.4
Chi-square(6, N=90) = 7.8, p = 0.25
Total Chi-square(6, N=366) = 49.73, p = 0.00
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Table E.2 Chi-Square Test of Independence of Experiment Versus Control Groups
on Selecting PTSD as the Primary Diagnosis by DSM Training
Training

DSM-IV

DSM-5

Both DSM-IV
and DSM-5

Neither or DSM-3
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Group Assignment
Teacher Veteran
Count
26
13
Anxiety Disorder
Std Residual
1.6
-1.5
Count
1
0
Bipolar II Disorder
Std Residual
0.7
-0.7
Borderline Personality Count
1
2
Disorder
Std Residual
-0.4
0.4
Major Depressive
Count
23
16
Disorder
Std Residual
0.9
-0.9
Persistent Depressive
Count
5
3
Disorder
Std Residual
0.5
-0.5
Count
6
30
PTSD
Std Residual
-2.8
2.7
Chi-square(5, N=126) = 23.40, p = 0.00
Count
16
11
Anxiety Disorder
Std Residual
0.8
-0.8
Count
1
2
Bipolar II Disorder
Std Residual
-0.4
0.4
Borderline Personality Count
2
0
Disorder
Std Residual
1.0
-1.0
Major Depressive
Count
14
13
Disorder
Std Residual
0.2
-0.2
Persistent Depressive
Count
4
4
Disorder
Std Residual
0.0
0.0
Count
5
14
PTSD
Std Residual
-1.4
1.4
Chi-square(5, N=86) = 7.52, p = 0.19
Count
19
15
Anxiety Disorder
Std Residual
0.3
-0.3
Count
3
0
Biploar I Disorder
Std Residual
1.1
-1.2
Count
2
0
Bipolar II Disorder
Std Residual
0.9
-1.0
Borderline Personality Count
1
2
Disorder
Std Residual
-0.5
0.5
Major Depressive
Count
26
11
Disorder
Std Residual
1.5
-1.6
Persistent Depressive
Count
6
4
Disorder
Std Residual
0.3
-0.4
Count
10
29
PTSD
Std Residual
-2.3
2.4
Chi-square(6, N=128) = 21.31, p = 0.002
Count
3
5
Anxiety Disorder
Std Residual
0.3
-0.2
Major Depressive
Count
3
2
Disorder
Std Residual
1.2
-0.8
Persistent Depressive
Count
1
0
Disorder
Std Residual
1.2
-0.8
Count
1
11
PTSD
Std Residual
-1.4
0.9
Diagnosis
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Chi-square(3, N=26) = 7.26, p = 0.064
Total Chi-square(6, N=366) = 49.74, p = 0.00

Table E.3 Chi-Square Test of Independence of Experiment Versus Control Groups
on Selecting PTSD as the Primary Diagnosis by Field of Highest Degree Earned
Field

Social Work

Psychology

Counseling

Nursing

Psychiatry
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Group Assignment
Teacher
Veteran
Count
37
25
Anxiety Disorder
Std Residual
1.3
-1.2
Count
2
0
Bipolar I Disorder
Std Residual
1.0
-1.0
Count
4
1
Bipolar II Disorder
Std Residual
1.0
-1.0
Borderline Personality
Count
3
1
Disorder
Std Residual
0.8
-0.7
Major Depressive
Count
33
23
Disorder
Std Residual
1.1
-1.1
Persistent Depressive
Count
11
7
Disorder
Std Residual
0.8
-0.7
Count
10
49
PTSD
Std Residual
-3.5
3.4
Chi-square(6, N=206) = 35.43, p = 0.00
Count
15
13
Anxiety Disorder
Std Residual
0.3
-0.3
Count
1
0
Bipolar I Disorder
Std Residual
0.7
-0.7
Borderline Personality
Count
1
2
Disorder
Std Residual
-0.4
0.4
Major Depressive
Count
24
9
Disorder
Std Residual
1.8
-1.8
Persistent Depressive
Count
3
2
Disorder
Std Residual
0.3
-0.3
Count
8
26
PTSD
Std Residual
-2.2
2.2
Chi-square(5, N=104) = 18.0, p = 0.003
Count
10
4
Anxiety Disorder
Std Residual
1.1
-1.1
Borderline Personality
Count
0
1
Disorder
Std Residual
-0.7
0.7
Major Depressive
Count
5
8
Disorder
Std Residual
-0.6
0.6
Persistent Depressive
Count
2
2
Disorder
Std Residual
0.0
0.0
Count
2
4
PTSD
Std Residual
-0.6
0.6
Chi-square(4, N=38) = 4.93, p = 0.23
Count
1
1
Anxiety Disorder
Std Residual
0.2
-0.2
Count
0
1
Bipolar II Disorder
Std Residual
-0.6
0.5
Major Depressive
Count
3
1
Disorder
Std Residual
1.1
-0.9
Count
0
3
PTSD
Std Residual
-1.1
0.9
Chi-square(3, N=10) = 4.8, p = 0.19
Count
1
1
Anxiety Disorder
Std Residual
0.0
0.0
Major Depressive
Count
1
1
Disorder
Std Residual
0.0
0.0
PTSD
Count
2
2
Diagnosis
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Std Residual
0.0
0.0
Chi-square(3, N=8) all cells have less than minimum expected count
Total Chi-square(6, N=366) = 49.73, p = 0.00

Table E.4 Chi-Square Test of Independence of Experiment Versus Control Groups
on Selecting PTSD as the Primary Diagnosis by Highest Educational Degree Earned
Group Assignment
Education Level Diagnosis
Teacher Veteran
Count
1
4
Anxiety Disorder
Std Residual
-0.1
0.1
Bachelors
Count
1
3
PTSD
Std Residual
0.1
-0.1
Chi-square(1, N=9) = 0.32, p = 0.86
Count
48
30
Anxiety Disorder
Std Residual
1.7
-1.7
Count
2
0
Bipolor I Disorder
Std Residual
1.1
-1.0
Count
4
1
Bipolar II Disorder
Std Residual
1.0
-1.0
Borderline Personality Count
3
2
Disorder
Std Residual
0.4
-0.4
Masters
Major Depressive
Count
42
34
Disorder
Std Residual
0.9
-0.9
Persistent Depressive Count
12
9
Disorder
Std Residual
0.6
-0.6
Count
11
57
PTSD
Std Residual
-3.8
3.6
Chi-square(6, N=255) = 40.14, p = 0.00
Count
15
10
Anxiety Disorder
Std Residual
0.4
-0.4
Count
1
0
Bipolor I Disorder
Std Residual
0.6
-0.7
Count
0
1
Bipolar II Disorder
Std Residual
-0.7
0.8
Doctoral
Borderline Personality Count
1
2
Disorder
Std Residual
-0.5
0.5
Major Depressive
Count
24
8
Disorder
Std Residual
1.6
-1.8
Persistent Depressive Count
4
2
Disorder
Std Residual
0.4
-0.5
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Count
10
Std Residual
-1.9
Chi-square(6, N=102) = 17.24, p = 0.008
Total Chi-square(6, N=366) = 49.73, p = 0.00
PTSD

24
2.1

Table E.5 Chi-Square Test of Independence of Experiment Versus Control Groups
on Selecting PTSD as the Primary Diagnosis by Theoretical Orientation
Theoretical Orientation

Cognitive-Behavioral

Eclectic

Humanistic / Person
Centered

Psychodynamic

No Primary Orientation
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Group Assignment
Teacher
Veteran
Count
30
17
Anxiety Disorder
Std Residual
1.4
-1.4
Count
1
0
Bipolar I Disorder
Std Residual
0.7
-0.7
Count
2
0
Bipolar II Disorder
Std Residual
1.0
-1.0
Borderline Personality
Count
2
2
Disorder
Std Residual
0.0
0.0
Major Depressive
Count
32
18
Disorder
Std Residual
1.5
-1.5
Persistent Depressive
Count
6
4
Disorder
Std Residual
0.5
-0.5
Count
8
43
PTSD
Std Residual
-3.4
3.3
Chi-square(6, N=165) = 34.89, p = 0.00
Count
8
7
Anxiety Disorder
Std Residual
0.8
-0.7
Borderline Personality
Count
0
2
Disorder
Std Residual
-0.9
0.7
Major Depressive
Count
11
6
Disorder
Std Residual
1.6
-1.3
Persistent Depressive
Count
2
1
Disorder
Std Residual
0.7
-0.6
Count
2
19
PTSD
Std Residual
-2.2
1.8
Chi-square(4, N=58) = 15.83, p = 0.003
Count
6
9
Anxiety Disorder
Std Residual
1.1
-1.1
Count
0
1
Bipolar II Disorder
Std Residual
-0.7
0.6
Borderline Personality
Count
1
0
Disorder
Std Residual
0.8
-0.7
Major Depressive
Count
6
4
Disorder
Std Residual
0.8
-0.7
Persistent Depressive
Count
2
2
Disorder
Std Residual
0.2
-0.2
Count
4
8
PTSD
Std Residual
-0.6
0.5
Chi-square(5, N=43) = 3.8, p = 0.58
Count
6
5
Anxiety Disorder
Std Residual
0.3
-0.3
Count
1
0
Bipolar I Disorder
Std Residual
0.7
-0.7
Major Depressive
Count
5
4
Disorder
Std Residual
0.3
-0.3
Count
2
6
PTSD
Std Residual
-0.9
0.9
Chi-square(3, N=29) = 3.17, p = 0.37
Count
7
6
Anxiety Disorder
Std Residual
0.5
-0.4
Count
1
0
Bipolar I Disorder
Std Residual
0.8
-0.7
Count
0
1
Bipolar II Disorder
Std Residual
-0.7
0.6
Borderline Personality
Count
1
0
Disorder
Std Residual
0.8
-0.7
Major Depressive
Count
1
1
Diagnosis
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Disorder
Persistent Depressive
Disorder

Std Residual
0.0
Count
4
Std Residual
0.5
Count
2
PTSD
Std Residual
-0.8
Chi-square(6, N=47) = 6.95, p = 0.33
Total Chi-square(6, N=366) = 49.73, p = 0.00
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